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THE FRAUDULENT JOINDER PREVENTION ACT OF 2016:
MOVING THE LAW IN THE WRONG DIRECTION
E. FARISH PERCY*
INTRODUCTION

A

S evidenced by continued removal/remand litigation involving allegations of fraudulent joinder,1 litigants and their lawyers believe that
the litigation forum matters a great deal.2 Plaintiffs generally view state
court as a more favorable forum while defendants generally prefer to litigate in federal court due to a perceived advantage.3 Plaintiffs and defendants alike engage in tactics to select and remain in the more favorable
* Professor and Mississippi Defense Lawyers Association Distinguished
Lecturer, University of Mississippi School of Law. The author is grateful for
support from the Mississippi Defense Lawyers Association and the Jamie Lloyd
Whitten Chair of Law and Government Endowment. The author would also like
to thank Professors Michèle Alexandre, Mercer Bullard, Christopher Green,
Matthew Hall, Jack Nowlin, and Steven Skultety for providing comments upon an
early draft of this Article.
1. A Westlaw search of federal court opinions that included the term “fraudulent joinder” yielded 466 district court opinions in 2015, 461 district court opinions in 2014, 509 district court opinions in 2013, fourteen circuit court opinions in
2015, thirteen circuit court opinions in 2014, and twenty-seven circuit court opinions in 2013. See Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2015: Hearing on H.R. 3624
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution and Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on Judiciary,
114th Congress 64 (2015) (statement of Professor Arthur D. Hellman) (“Today,
removal is a major battleground in civil litigation.”) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R.
3624].
2. See Allyson Singer Breeden, Federal Removal Jurisdiction and Its Effect on Plaintiff Win-Rates, RES GESTAE, Sept. 2002, at 26 (concluding “plaintiff’s ability to avoid
removal [from state to federal court] could mean the difference between winning
and losing”); Paul Rosenthal, Improper Joinder: Confronting Plaintiffs’ Attempts to Destroy Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 49, 55 (2009) (“Forum selection is often the most important strategic decision a party makes in a lawsuit.”);
James M. Underwood, From Proxy to Principle: Fraudulent Joinder Reconsidered, 69 ALB.
L. REV. 1013, 1013–16 (2006) (concluding forum has “profound impact on the
adjudication of claims”). Empirical research has indicated that defendants experience an actual benefit in cases removed based upon diversity in comparison to
cases originally filed in federal court based upon diversity. See Kevin M. Clermont
& Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 598–99 (1998).
Even absent empirical evidence demonstrating a real difference between state and
federal court, given that the large majority of cases are resolved by settlement
rather than trial, even the perception of an advantage based upon forum matters.
See Rosenthal, supra, at 55–56; Underwood, supra, at 1013–14.
3. See E. Farish Percy, Making a Federal Case of It: Removing Civil Cases to Federal
Court Based on Fraudulent Joinder, 91 IOWA L. REV. 189, 191 (2005); Rosenthal, supra
note 2, at 50; Underwood, supra note 2, at 1013–14.
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forum.4 For example, a plaintiff who has a state law tort claim against a
citizen from another state may use “strategies to avoid removal” of that
claim from state court to federal court based upon diversity jurisdiction by
joining a claim against a “non-diverse defendant,” thereby defeating complete diversity.5 If the defendant believes that the plaintiff improperly
joined the non-diverse defendant for the purpose of defeating removal,
the defendant may engage in forum selection by removing the case to
federal court and asserting that complete diversity actually exists because
the plaintiff fraudulently joined the non-diverse defendant.6 Thus, the interpretation and application of the fraudulent joinder doctrine plays a vital role in determining the final forum for numerous cases involving state
law claims.7
The Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016,8 currently pending
before Congress, is intended to reform the existing common law fraudulent joinder doctrine by codifying a “uniform” and “more robust version”
of the doctrine that will make it easier for diverse defendants to remove
civil cases from state court to federal court based upon allegations of
fraudulent joinder.9 One commentator has remarked not only upon the
speed with which the bill was passed by the House of Representatives, but
also upon congressional intent to change existing common law and move
it in a direction that lowers the threshold for removal.10
4. See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 50–51. Although “forum shopping” is viewed
by some as improper or taboo, forum shopping in a manner that is consistent with
applicable statutes and rules governing jurisdiction is “widespread, responsible,
and expected as a part of modern litigation.” See id. at 56–57 (citing J. Skelly
Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REV.
317, 333 (1967)); see also Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 105–08 (1999) (concluding lawyers
acting within confines of applicable law for purpose of forum shopping are acting
ethically); Richard Maloy, Forum Shopping? What’s Wrong with That?, 24 QUINNIPIAC.
L. REV. 25, 25–26, 60 (2005) (concluding in order to represent clients fully and
effectively, lawyers may and should engage in permissible forum selection); Georgene M. Vairo, Is Selecting Shopping?, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 18, 2000 (arguing forum
shopping is improper only when choice of forum is “frivolous”).
5. See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 50–51, 60–62.
6. See id.
7. See Underwood, supra note 2, at 1018.
8. Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016, H.R. 3624, 114th Cong. First
introduced in the House of Representatives on September 28, 2015, the bill was
reported out of the House Judiciary Committee with amendments and passed in
amended form by the House of Representatives on February 25, 2016. It has been
referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. For a discussion of the evolution of
the bill, see Arthur D. Hellman, The Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016: A New
Standard and a New Rationale for an Old Doctrine, 17 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV., June
2016, at 34, 36–37. As this Article was going to publication, an identical bill, the
Innocent Party Protection Act of 2017, was introduced in the House of Representatives on January 20, 2017. It was passed by the House on March 9, 2017. See H.R.
725, 115th Cong. (2017).
9. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-422, at 2–5 (2016).
10. See Hellman, supra note 8, at 39 (“The purpose of the legislation is to
change the law.”).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss1/6

2

Percy: The Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016: Moving the Law in

2017]

FRAUDULENT JOINDER PREVENTION

215

The fraudulent joinder doctrine was first established over one hundred years ago by the Supreme Court in an effort to thwart plaintiffs’
wrongful attempts to defeat a diverse defendant’s right to remove a civil
case from state court to federal court by joining a frivolous claim against a
non-diverse defendant.11 The bill’s advocates note that the Supreme
Court has not addressed or clarified the doctrine since the early 1900s,
and they claim that legislation is necessary because lower courts apply the
current common law doctrine inconsistently and impose an unfairly heavy
burden of proving fraudulent joinder upon removing defendants.12 The
bill’s opponents argue that it is an “anti-civil justice measure” that will facilitate “corporate forum shopping” while preventing plaintiffs from vindicating state law claims that properly belong in state court.13 Although some
11. See Percy, supra note 3, at 205–15 (discussing Supreme Court’s creation of
doctrine in early 1900s); see also infra notes 31–52 and accompanying text.
12. See H.R. 3624, at 2. The representatives in favor of the bill characterize it
as one that “makes a modest change to existing law” for the purpose of “mak[ing]
the law more fair” by making it easier for out-of-state defendants to remove cases
from state court to federal court successfully and by protecting in-state individuals
and local businesses from protracted litigation in state court. See id. Advocates of
the bill also claim that it is consistent with federalism principles. See id. at 4. Not
surprisingly, groups such as the American Chamber of Commerce and the National Federation of Independent Business favor the bill. See id. at 10, 13–14.
13. See Susan Steinman, Damages Caps Bill Stalled in Committee, TRIAL, June
2016, at 18 (characterizing bill as one of four anti-civil justice measures currently
pending in Senate); see also Hellman, supra note 8, at 34 (noting opponents of bill
contend it will obstruct justice for plaintiffs suing corporations for personal injury
and expend limited federal judicial resources); Susan Steinman, Help Fight Corporate Forum Shopping, TRIAL, Apr. 2016, at 16 (characterizing bill as “ ‘corporate forum shoppin bill” (internal quotation marks omitted)). To the extent the bill
does delay and deny justice for plaintiffs with state law claims, the bill may be
viewed as part of what some commentators have called the “counter-revolution” in
civil procedure and tort law. During this counter-revolution, various barriers or
hurdles to justice have been created by federal legislation, such as the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 and the Federal Arbitration Act, by various tort reform legislation and by Supreme Court interpretation of the procedural rules governing summary judgment, personal jurisdiction, discovery, pleading, and class certification,
as well as amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including recent
amendments to the discovery rules imposing proportionality limitations that some
argue will disparately impact plaintiffs. See, e.g., Christopher J. Roederer, Democracy
and Tort Law in America: The Counter-Revolution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 647, 685–86,
698–700 (2008) (arguing that Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, which increased
federal court original and removal jurisdiction over class actions based upon state
law, “impede[s] plaintiffs’ access to justice” because of significant hurdles to class
certification imposed by federal procedural rules and Supreme Court interpretation of those rules and arguing that Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of Federal Arbitration Act creates barriers to justice for plaintiffs, which are detrimental
to consumers and other less powerful plaintiffs (citing Allan Kanner, Interpreting the
Class Action Fairness Act in a Truly Fair Manner, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1654 (2006)));
A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to
Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 448 (2013) (arguing that Supreme Court’s interpretation of commonality requirement for class certification pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
23, its interpretation of summary judgment standard pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56,
and its interpretation of pleading standards pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 are all
part of fairly recent trend “in the direction of restricting access to justice by mak-
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of the bill’s minor provisions reasonably resolve existing inconsistencies in
the manner in which lower courts currently apply the common law fraudulent joinder doctrine, the bill, in its entirety, will not achieve the uniformity, effectiveness or fairness purportedly desired by its advocates.14
Instead, the bill, if enacted, will significantly alter existing law15 in a manner that will: (i) ”delay [or] possibly deny justice for [many] plaintiffs with
meritorious state law claims,” (ii) increase fraudulent joinder litigation
and concomitant costs to the parties and the federal courts, (iii) introduce
even greater uncertainty and complexity into an already complicated area
of the law, and (iv) raise serious federalism concerns by intruding upon
the states’ ability to establish and decide state substantive and procedural
law.16
Most notably, the bill establishes a more lenient standard for fraudulent joinder by providing that a defendant has been fraudulently joined if
the district court finds that “it is not plausible to conclude that applicable
State law would impose liability on [that] defendant.”17 An interrelated
procedural provision authorizes district courts to consider extrinsic evidence when making this plausibility determination and places no limitation upon such consideration. The plausibility pleading standard
established in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly18 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal19 forms
the basis for the bill’s plausibility standard.20 The plausibility pleading
ing it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring claims and have them” decided upon
merits); Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil
Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839, 1848 (2014) (“Plausibility pleading . . . is nothing less than a ‘revolutionary’ departure from notice pleading and from the original vision of the Federal Rules.”).
14. As discussed infra at notes 84–94 and 189–98 and accompanying text, the
bill does reasonably resolve lower court splits with respect to: (i) whether the doctrine applies solely to the joinder of non-diverse defendants or also to the joinder
of diverse in-state defendants or (ii) whether district courts may consider affirmative defenses when determining fraudulent joinder.
15. See Hearing on H.R. 3624, supra note 1, at 29 (statement of Professor Lonny
Hoffman) (noting bill would “dramatically alter existing [jurisdictional] law”).
16. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-422, at 18–19 (2016). Representatives opposing the
bill have made similar predictions. See id. President Obama’s administration
strongly opposed the bill, arguing that it “[will make] it more difficult for individuals to vindicate their rights in State courts” and characterizing it as “a solution in
search of a problem.” See 162 CONG. REC. H912 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 2016) (statement of Administration Policy, Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget). In addition, groups such as Alliance for Justice, American
Association of Justice, Consumer Federation of America, Consumer Watchdog, National Association of Consumer Advocates, and Public Citizen oppose the bill. See
id. (statement of Rep. Conyers).
17. See H.R. REP NO. 114-422, at 2–4 (calling current standard “very demanding” and predicting that bill would provide “better opportunity” to defendants to
secure federal forums by removing based upon fraudulent joinder); see also Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016, H.R. 3624, 114th Cong. § 2.
18. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
19. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
20. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-422, at 12 (stating term “plausible” was taken from
Supreme Court’s opinions in Twombly and Iqbal and suggesting that Court’s deci-
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standard has generated an enormous amount of litigation and controversy, and it has failed to establish a uniform pleading standard.21 Based
upon the fallout from Twombly and Iqbal, it is reasonable to predict that
the bill’s plausibility standard for fraudulent joinder will raise even greater
difficulty given that district courts will have to make the plausibility finding
based on the pleadings and extrinsic evidence presumably related to the
merits of the state law claim against the non-diverse spoiler. The manner
in which the plausibility pleading standard should be transposed to the
fraudulent joinder evidentiary standard is not self-evident. Even if the bill
is not passed during this legislative session, its advocates are likely to continue to introduce and seek support for similar legislation in the future.22
Given the frequency with which fraudulent joinder is litigated, it is
imperative that any legislation altering the doctrine be carefully considered.23 Congress should determine whether the bill appropriately balances (i) federalism concerns that are raised every time Congress
broadens original diversity jurisdiction or removal jurisdiction based upon
diversity, (ii) diverse defendants’ interests in having state law claims decided in federal court, (iii) whether there is any helpful existing precedent
that will guide courts in the application of new fraudulent joinder standards, (iv) the likely success of any new fraudulent joinder standards in
achieving uniformity, (v) the additional costs that will be generated by the
increased fraudulent joinder litigation that the bill is certain to produce,
and (vi) whether the new fraudulent joinder standards will give rise to
greater abuse by removing defendants.
Part I of this Article reviews the current framework for removal based
upon diversity jurisdiction and the development and application of the
common law fraudulent joinder doctrine. Part I also includes a discussion
of the degree to which lower courts apply the doctrine inconsistently. Part
sions in those cases will provide “substantial guidance” regarding meaning of
term).
21. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to
Twiqbal Apologists, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1710, 1712 (2013) (observing Twombly and
Iqbal caused uproar and that resulting rule is “pernicious for its overinclusiveness,
subjectivity, and disruptiveness” (footnotes omitted)); Joseph A. Steiner, The
Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination
Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1038–41 (discussing circuit courts’ differing interpretations of Twombly); Michael Eaton, Comment, The Key to the Courthouse Door:
The Effect of Ashcroft v. Iqbal and the Heightened Pleading Standard, 51 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 299, 319–25 (2011) (discussing inconsistent application of plausibility
pleading standard); Colleen McNamara, Note, Iqbal as Judicial Rorschach Test: An
Empirical Study of District Court Interpretations of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 105 NW. U. L. REV.
401, 403–04 (2011) (concluding “Twombly and Iqbal opinions have actually created
more inconsistency in the federal pleading standards across (and even within) the
circuits”).
22. As discussed supra in note 8, The Innocent Party Protection Act of 2017 is
identical legislation recently introduced in the 115th Congress and passed by the
House of Representatives on March 9, 2017.
23. See supra note 1 (noting that district courts decide more than 450 fraudulent joinder cases each year).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017

5

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 6

218

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62: p. 213

II parses the provisions of the Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016.
Part III of this Article addresses whether the fraudulent joinder doctrine
should apply to diverse in-state defendants and to non-diverse defendants
and concludes that it should.
Part IV then turns to the bill’s most significant provision that would
transform existing law by establishing a lower threshold for fraudulent
joinder based upon a finding that it is not plausible to conclude that state
law would impose liability upon the non-diverse defendant. In doing so,
Part IV compares and contrasts this standard with the plausibility standard
established in the pleading context in Twombly and Iqbal. This Article
predicts that the plausibility standard contemplated by the bill will not be
consistently or uniformly applied and that the vague and ambiguous nature of the standard will encourage defendants to remove cases in which
there has been no fraudulent joinder. Moreover, this Article argues that
the bill’s plausibility standard raises serious federalism concerns.
Part V of this Article considers the bill’s most significant procedural
provision authorizing district courts to consider extrinsic evidence when
determining fraudulent joinder. This Article argues that a district court’s
consideration of extrinsic evidence should be limited to ensure that the
district court is determining jurisdiction rather than determining the merits of the claim against the jurisdictional spoiler.
The remainder of this Article addresses the bill’s other three grounds
for fraudulent joinder. Part VI of this Article analyzes the bill’s provision
basing fraudulent joinder upon a finding that the claims against the defendant are clearly barred by state or federal law, including affirmative
defenses and common defenses. This Article argues that district courts
should be permitted to consider certain affirmative defenses when determining fraudulent joinder but not common defenses.
Part VII critiques the bill’s provision basing fraudulent joinder upon a
finding that objective evidence clearly demonstrates that there is no good
faith intention to prosecute the action against the jurisdictional spoiler.
This Article concludes that this standard for determining fraudulent joinder will be inefficient given that little objective evidence is likely to exist at
the time a motion to remand is ruled upon and the relative ease with
which plaintiffs may create evidence of a good faith intent to prosecute.
Part VIII examines the bill’s provision basing fraudulent joinder upon
a finding of actual fraud in the plaintiff’s pleading of jurisdictional facts.
It explores the meaning of “actual fraud” and “jurisdictional facts,” terms
that are not defined in the proposed legislation, and also considers the
applicable evidentiary burden. This Article asserts that this provision
raises many unanswered questions and is also unnecessary.
This Article concludes that, although some judicial or legislative reform is desirable for the purpose of establishing greater uniformity and
clarity with respect to the application of the fraudulent joinder doctrine,
the bill would establish a problematic, multi-pronged standard for fraudu-
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lent joinder that will create even greater uncertainty and lack of uniformity, unfairly deny or delay justice for some plaintiffs, and also raise grave
federalism concerns.
I. THE COMMON LAW FRAUDULENT JOINDER DOCTRINE
A.

Existing Statutory Procedure for Removal and Remand

In order to evaluate the manner in which the fraudulent joinder doctrine should be reformed, this Section first reviews the existing statutory
framework for removal based upon diversity jurisdiction and the Supreme
Court’s precedent establishing the fraudulent joinder doctrine in the early
1900s. It then analyzes the manner in which the doctrine is currently applied by lower courts and considers whether reform is desirable.
Under existing law, a civil case may be removed from state court to
federal court based upon diversity jurisdiction only if the case could have
been originally filed in federal court based upon diversity jurisdiction.24 A
federal district court may exercise original diversity jurisdiction over a civil
case if there is complete diversity between the plaintiff(s) and defendant(s) and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.25 In addition, a case may not be removed based upon
diversity jurisdiction if any properly-joined and served defendant is a citizen of the forum state.26 Thus, a plaintiff may attempt to defeat a diverse
defendant’s right to remove by joining claims against a non-diverse defendant, thereby destroying complete diversity, or by joining a diverse in-state
defendant, thereby rendering removal improper pursuant to the forum
defendant rule. In this sense, non-diverse defendants and in-state defendants are jurisdictional spoilers for removal.
As grounds for removal in a case in which the plaintiff sued a diverse
defendant and a non-diverse defendant, the diverse defendant may remove based upon complete diversity by asserting that the plaintiff fraudulently joined the non-diverse defendant.27 In response, the plaintiff may
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012).
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012). Minimal diversity exists when at least one
plaintiff and one defendant are citizens of different states; complete diversity exists
when no plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the same state. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.3.3 & n.34 (4th ed. 2003). The Constitution authorizes federal courts to exercise jurisdiction based upon minimal diversity. See
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967) (interpreting
Article III, Section 2 of Constitution as authorizing jurisdiction based upon minimal diversity). Although Congress has extended federal court jurisdiction to a relatively narrow range of cases involving minimal diversity jurisdiction by enacting
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 and the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, the jurisdiction granted by Section 1332(a) requires complete
diversity. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806).
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). This provision is sometimes referred to as the
forum defendant rule. See, e.g., Morris v. Nuzzo, 718 F.3d 660, 663–64 (7th Cir.
2013).
27. In order to remove a case to federal court, the defendant must file a notice of removal in the federal district court containing a short and plain statement
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move to remand, arguing that complete diversity is lacking because the
non-diverse defendant was not fraudulently joined.28 In ruling on the motion to remand, the district court must determine whether the plaintiff
fraudulently joined the non-diverse defendant. If so, the court will dismiss
the claims against the non-diverse defendant and retain jurisdiction over
the remaining claims against the diverse defendant.29 If not, the district
court will remand the case back to state court.30
B.

Supreme Court Precedent Establishing the Doctrine

The Supreme Court first affirmed removal based upon fraudulent
joinder in Wecker v. National Enameling & Stamping Co.31 There, Wecker
sued his diverse employer for negligence in state court, alleging that his
employer negligently failed to guard and cover pots filled with boiling
grease and lubricants.32 Wecker’s job required him to lift barrels of grease
to the top of a furnace structure and dump the contents into pots.33
Wecker alleged that “he lost his balance” on top of the furnace and “fell
of the grounds for removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2012). All properly-joined
and served defendants must join in or consent to the removal. See id.
§ 1446(b)(2)(A). If the plaintiff’s initial pleading is removable, the defendant
shall file the notice of removal within thirty days after the earliest of (i) the defendant’s receipt of the initial pleading or (ii) service of summons on the defendant if
the initial pleading has been filed and is not required to be served upon the defendant. See id. § 1446(b). If the plaintiff’s initial pleading is not removable but later
becomes removable, the defendant may file the notice of removal “within thirty
days after receipt . . . of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other
paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has
become removable.” See id. § 1446(b)(3). “A case may not be removed . . . on the
basis of [diversity jurisdiction] more than [one] year after commencement of the
action [in state court], unless the district court finds that the plaintiff has acted in
bad faith in order to prevent a defendant from removing the action.” Id.
§ 1446(c)(1). In addition, in a case originally lacking complete diversity, the plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of the non-diverse defendant renders the case removable
but the court’s “involuntary” dismissal of the non-diverse defendant does not. See
Percy, supra note 3, at 207–11 (discussing voluntary/involuntary rule and its traditional justifications).
28. After a case has been removed to federal court, the plaintiff may file a
motion to remand to state court, arguing that the case was improperly removed.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2012). Motions to remand based upon lack of subject
matter jurisdiction may be filed at any time; motions to remand based upon other
defects must be made within thirty days after the filing of the notice of removal.
See id.
29. See, e.g., Walters v. Metro. Lloyds Ins. Co. of Tex., No. 4:16-CV-307, 2016
WL 3764855, at *3–4 (E.D. Tex. July 14, 2016) (dismissing jurisdictional spoiler
after finding fraudulent joinder and retaining jurisdiction over remaining clams
against diverse defendant).
30. See, e.g., Brooks v. Merck & Co., 443 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1006–07 (S.D. Ill.
2006) (remanding case to state court after finding that removing defendant failed
to prove fraudulent joinder).
31. 204 U.S. 176 (1907).
32. See id. at 178.
33. See id.
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into one of the open, unguarded, and unprotected pots” filled with boiling grease.34 Wecker joined claims against Schenck and Wettengel, two
allegedly non-diverse co-employees, asserting that they were responsible
for the design and maintenance of the furnace structure and for supervising Wecker.35 Wecker’s diverse employer removed, asserting that Schenck
was diverse from Wecker and that Wettengel was not responsible for designing or maintaining the furnace structure or for supervising Wecker.36
The employer submitted an affidavit in which the employer’s head engineer stated that Wettengel was merely a draftsman who made drawings for
the mechanics after Wettengel had been given the plans.37 The engineer
further stated that Wettengel had no authority to select or approve the
plans or to employ, discharge or supervise other workers, including
Wecker.38 In response, Wecker submitted an affidavit in which he stated
that he had heard the engineer direct Wettengel to prepare plans for the
furnace.39 In ruling on the motion to remand, the district court considered the affidavits and concluded that Wecker had fraudulently joined
Wettengel.40
The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that Wettengel was fraudulently
joined for the purpose of defeating the diverse employer’s right to remove.41 The Court held that “[f]ederal courts should not sanction devices
intended to prevent a removal to a [f]ederal court where one has that
right, and should be equally vigilant to protect the right to proceed in the
[f]ederal court as to permit the state courts, in proper cases, to retain their
own jurisdiction.”42 In finding fraudulent joinder, the Court essentially
found no reasonable basis for Wecker’s allegation that Wettengel was employed in a position that gave rise to any duty to select, review, or alter the
design plans for the furnace or to supervise Wecker.43
In Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Cockrell,44 the plaintiff sued a diverse railway company, a non-diverse engineer, and a non-diverse fireman
for negligently causing the death of plaintiff’s intestate.45 The Supreme
Court held that plaintiff’s joinder of the non-diverse engineer and fireman
34. See id.
35. See id. at 179.
36. See id. at 179–80.
37. See id. at 183–84.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 184.
40. See id. at 180–81.
41. See id. at 185. The Court determined that Wecker’s affidavit did not rebut,
and was consistent with, the other “undisputed testimony as to the nature and
character of Wettengel’s employment in the subordinate capacity of a draftsman.”
See id.
42. See id. at 186.
43. See id. at 185 (stating “apparent want of basis for the allegations” led to
conclusion that Wettengel “was joined for the purpose of defeating [removal]”).
44. 232 U.S. 146 (1914).
45. See id. at 149.
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was not fraudulent because the removing employer failed to prove that the
joinder “was without any reasonable basis.”46
In Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co.,47 the Supreme Court affirmed
the district court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion to remand.48 Wilson sued
his diverse employer and a non-diverse co-employee alleging that they
were jointly liable for injuries he sustained in the course of employment.49
The diverse employer removed, asserting that the non-diverse co-employee was not present when the plaintiff was injured and was in no way
responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries.50 Defendant’s petition of removal
was sworn and plaintiff failed to contest the sworn petition.51 The Court
affirmed the lower court’s finding of fraudulent joinder, holding that a
diverse defendant’s right to remove “cannot be defeated by a fraudulent
joinder of a resident defendant having no real connection with the
controversy.”52
C.

Current Application of the Fraudulent Joinder Doctrine

The modern day fraudulent joinder doctrine is not only complex, but
is also applied in a somewhat inconsistent and varied manner throughout
the country.53 Rather than inquiring into the plaintiff’s subjective motive
for joining the spoiler, courts generally use an objective test focused on
the basis for the plaintiff’s claim against the spoiler.54 Most courts employ
46. See id. at 153.
47. 257 U.S. 92 (1921).
48. See id. at 99.
49. The claim against the employer was based upon a state statute, and the
claim against the co-employee was based upon common law negligence. See id. at
93.
50. See id. at 97.
51. See id. at 94–95. As explained by the Court, under then existing procedure, if the plaintiff had contested the defendant’s sworn petition for removal, the
removing defendant would then have had the burden of proving fraudulent joinder. See id. at 97. Under current procedure, the notice of removal is neither sworn
nor verified.
52. See id. at 97 (citing Wecker v. Nat’l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S.
176, 185, 186 (1907)).
53. See Percy, supra note 3, at 216–39 (discussing different fraudulent joinder
tests used by lower courts, varying degree to which lower courts authorize consideration of extrinsic evidence, and inconsistency in lower courts’ consideration of
affirmative defenses, including common defenses).
54. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT 515 (AM. LAW INST. 2004)
(“[I]n most instances, ‘fraudulent’ is a term of art that is applied without regard to
the plaintiff’s state of mind.” (citing Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Phila. Elec. Co.,
651 F. Supp. 1364, 1366 n.1 (D. Colo. 1987))); Hellman, supra note 8, at 35; Percy,
supra note 3, at 217. Although many circuit courts have acknowledged that fraudulent joinder may be based upon actual fraud in the pleadings, very few cases actually involve fraud in the pleadings. See infra notes 237–39 and accompanying text.
In addition, a few courts have considered whether the plaintiff subjectively intends
in good faith to obtain a judgment against the spoiler. Both of these subjective
standards—the “actual fraud in the pleading” standard and the “lack of good faith
intent to prosecute” standard are likely to be costly, problematic, and inefficient.
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some variant of the following four predominant tests to determine fraudulent joinder: (i) the “reasonable basis for the claim” test that focuses on
whether there is a reasonable basis in law and fact for the claim against the
spoiler,55 (ii) the “no possibility” of recovery test that asks whether there is
any possibility the plaintiff will recover from the spoiler,56 (iii) the “reasonable possibility” of recovery test that asks whether there is any reasonable possibility the plaintiff will recover from the spoiler,57 and (iv) the
failure to state a claim test that focuses on whether the complaint states a
claim against the spoiler pursuant to state law.58 While these tests are arSee infra notes 213–64 and accompanying text. Thus, this Article contends that an
objective standard focused on the basis for the plaintiff’s claim against the spoiler
should be used to determine fraudulent joinder.
55. See, e.g., Wivell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 773 F.3d 887, 893 (8th Cir.
2014) (joinder is fraudulent “if there is no reasonable basis for the imposition of
liability under state law”); Spizizen v. Nat’l City Corp., 516 F. App’x 426, 429 (6th
Cir. 2013) (“To prove fraudulent joinder, the removing defendant must show that
the plaintiff did not have a colorable cause of action against the defendant in state
court.” (citing Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 492–93 (6th Cir. 1999)));
Roggio v. McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, 415 F. App’x 432, 433 (3d Cir.
2011) (citing In re Briscoe, 488 F.3d 201, 216 (3d Cir. 2006)); Smoot v. Chi., Rock
Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 378 F.2d 879, 881 (10th Cir. 1967) (stating issue is “whether
the allegations . . . were without factual basis and a complete sham”).
56. See, e.g., Johnson v. Am. Towers, LLC, 781 F.3d 693, 704 (4th Cir. 2015)
(stating joinder is fraudulent if “ ‘there is no possibility that the plaintiff would be
able to establish a cause of action against the in-state defendant in state court’ ”
(quoting Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 424 (4th Cir. 1999))); Ullah v.
BAC Homes Loans Servicing LP, 538 F. App’x 844, 845–46 (11th Cir. 2013) (stating joinder is fraudulent if “there is no possibility the plaintiff can establish a cause
of action against the resident defendant” (quoting Stillwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 663
F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Briarpatch
Ltd., L.P. v. Phx. Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 302 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating joinder is
fraudulent if “there is no possibility that the claims against that defendant could be
asserted in state court” (citing Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 461
(2d Cir. 1998))).
57. See, e.g., Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752, 764 (7th Cir.
2009) (stating joinder is not fraudulent if there “is ‘any reasonable possibility’ that
the plaintiff could prevail against the non-diverse defendant” (quoting Poulos v.
Naas Foods, Inc., 959 F.2d 69, 71 (7th Cir. 1992))); Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R.
Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he test for fraudulent joinder is
whether the defendant has demonstrated that there is no possibility of recovery by
the plaintiff against an in-state defendant, which stated differently means that
there is no reasonable basis for the district court to predict that the plaintiff might
be able to recover against an in-state defendant.”).
58. See, e.g., Weeping Hollow Ave. Tr. v. Spencer, No. 13-16060, 2016 WL
4088749, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2016) (quoting McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp., 811
F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987)) (stating joinder is fraudulent “[i]f the plaintiff
fails to state a cause of action against a resident defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the settled rules of the state” (quoting Morris v. Princess Cruises,
Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001)) (alteration in original)); Universal
Truck & Equip. Co. v. Southworth-Milton, Inc., 765 F.3d 103, 108 (1st Cir. 2014)
(stating joinder is fraudulent if “there is no reasonable possibility that the state’s
highest court would find that the complaint states a cause of action upon which
relief may be granted against the non-diverse defendant” (citing Poulos, 959 F.2d at
73; McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987))).
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guably substantially similar in that they all focus in some manner on the
plaintiff’s basis for the claim against the spoiler, they will render different
outcomes in at least a narrow range of cases.
In addition, “[circuit] courts differ in the degree to which [district
courts should] pierce the pleadings and consider extrinsic evidence” when
determining fraudulent joinder.59 While many courts have sanctioned
some form of limited piercing of the pleadings, other courts engage in
much broader piercing of the pleadings in a procedure that resembles a
summary judgment-type procedure.60 Although the large majority of
courts will consider certain affirmative defenses when determining fraudulent joinder, there is less agreement over consideration of common defenses—defenses that equally dispose of the plaintiff’s claim against the
spoiler and the diverse defendant.61
Thus, in some cases, a diverse defendant’s ability to remove varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.62 Given the inconsistency and lack of
clarity regarding the doctrine’s application, there is certainly room for reform and improvement, but Congress should carefully consider any proposed reform to ensure that it moves the fraudulent joinder doctrine in
the correct direction.63
II. THE FRAUDULENT JOINDER PREVENTION ACT’S PROVISIONS
This Section briefly summarizes each provision of the bill in the order
of its appearance to facilitate an understanding of the provisions and the
manner in which they interrelate. The bill would amend 28 U.S.C. § 1447,
governing procedure after removal, including motions to remand, by adding subparagraph (f). Proposed subsection (f)(1) indicates that subparagraph (f) applies only to cases: (i) removed to federal court based upon
diversity jurisdiction, (ii) in which the plaintiff then files a motion to remand alleging that removal was improper because there is incomplete diversity or an in-state defendant, and (iii) in which the defendant opposes
the motion to remand by claiming that the plaintiff fraudulently joined
the non-diverse or in-state defendant. This provision resolves a split
59. E. Farish Percy, Defining the Contours of the Emerging Fraudulent Misjoinder
Doctrine, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 569, 581 (2006).
60. See Percy, supra note 3, at 224–26.
61. See id. at 229–39; see also infra notes 178–86 and accompanying text.
Courts have inconsistently decided other issues regarding the fraudulent joinder
doctrine that are not addressed by the bill. For example, the bill does not attempt
to resolve issues regarding the application of the emerging fraudulent misjoinder
doctrine, holding that fraudulent joinder occurs when a plaintiff with meritorious
claims against the diverse and non-diverse defendants has improperly joined the
claims together in one lawsuit in violation of governing procedural joinder rules.
See Percy, supra note 59 (discussing emerging doctrine and issues regarding its
application).
62. See Percy, supra note 3, at 195.
63. See id. (discussing manner in which common law fraudulent joinder doctrine should be improved and clarified).
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among district courts by clarifying that the fraudulent joinder doctrine
applies to the joinder of diverse in-state defendants, as well as to the joinder of non-diverse defendants.64
Subsection (f)(2) then lists four alternative grounds upon which a
district court may find fraudulent joinder.65 Subsection (f)(2)(A) provides that joinder of a defendant is fraudulent if the district court finds
“there is actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts with respect to
that defendant.”66 House Report 422 indicates that this subsection merely
codifies existing common law and suggests that “actual fraud” involves
“‘false allegations,’ such as misrepresenting or concealing the citizenship
of a party.”67
Subsection (f)(2)(B) provides that joinder of a defendant is fraudulent if the district court finds, after considering the pleadings, amended
pleadings, affidavits, and other extrinsic evidence, that “it is not plausible
to conclude that applicable State law would impose liability on that defendant.”68 This provision establishes a more lenient standard for establishing fraudulent joinder because it repudiates the “any reasonable
possibility that state law will impose liability on the defendant” standard
and replaces it with a plausibility standard. Although not evident from the
bill’s language, House Report 422 indicates that the bill’s plausibility standard is essentially a “reasonable likelihood” standard requiring the court
to determine, after reviewing the pleadings and the evidence, “whether
there is a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff can muster factual support for each element of the state-law claim.”69 This provision, more than
any other, would significantly alter the current common law fraudulent
joinder doctrine.
Subsection (f)(2)(C) provides that joinder of a defendant is fraudulent if the district court finds that “[s]tate or [f]ederal law clearly bars all
claims in the complaint against that defendant.”70 This provision is intended to resolve a split among lower courts over whether affirmative de64. A Virginia citizen who sues a New York citizen in Ohio state court may
defeat removal jurisdiction by joining a defendant who is a citizen of Virginia, a
non-diverse defendant, or by joining a defendant who is a citizen of Ohio, a diverse
in-state defendant. Most district courts apply the fraudulent joinder doctrine to
the joinder of diverse in-state defendants in addition to the joinder of non-diverse
defendants. A few district courts, primarily those in the Southern District of Illinois, limit the doctrine’s application to the joinder of non-diverse defendants. See
H.R. REP. NO. 114-422, at 10 & n.13 (2016).
65. See Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016, H.R. 3624, 114th Cong.
§ 2.
66. See id.
67. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-422, at 12.
68. See H.R. 3624 § 2.
69. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-422, at 13 (noting that “reasonable likelihood” standard is “quite different” from “reasonable possibility” standard currently used by
many courts).
70. See H.R. 3624 § 2.
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fenses can be considered as bases for finding fraudulent joinder.71 The
provision’s reference to state and federal law makes it clear that defenses
based upon state and federal law, such as defenses based upon the statute
of limitations, federal preemption, and immunity, may be considered
when determining fraudulent joinder.72 When read together, subsections
(f)(2)(B) & (C) would abrogate the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Smallwood v.
Illinois Central Railroad Co.,73 holding that common defenses cannot constitute bases for finding fraudulent joinder.74
Subsection (f)(2)(D) provides that joinder of a defendant is fraudulent if the district court finds that “objective evidence clearly demonstrates
that there is no good faith intention to prosecute the action against that
defendant or to seek a joint judgment including that defendant.”75 House
Report 422 indicates that the district court may consider only objective
evidence of the plaintiff’s intent—a district court “should not inquire into
the subjective intent of the plaintiff or his or her lawyer.”76
Subsection (f)(3) provides that the district court “may permit the
pleadings to be amended, and shall consider the pleadings, affidavits, and
other evidence submitted by the parties” when determining fraudulent
joinder.77 House Report 422 characterizes this provision as a codification
of existing law.78 Most circuit courts, however, have held that consideration of extrinsic evidence should be limited so as to ensure that a determination of jurisdiction does not become a determination on the merits.79
The bill does not place any limitation on the court’s consideration of extrinsic evidence or the scope of discovery that may be pursued while the
motion to remand is pending in federal court. House Report 422 suggests
71. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-422, at 14.
72. See id.
73. 385 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2004).
74. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-422, at 14.
75. See H.R. 3624, § 2.
76. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-422, at 15. As discussed infra in notes 234–13 and
accompanying text, many courts will not consider evidence of the plaintiff’s subjective intent.
77. See H.R. 3624 § 2.
78. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-422, at 15 (stating bill is consistent with “widely followed judicial practice of considering affidavits and other materials outside the
pleadings when determining whether joinder is fraudulent” (citing Herkenhoff v.
Supervalu Stores, Inc., No. 4:13CV1974 SNLJ, 2014 WL 3894642, at *3 (E.D. Mo.
Aug. 18, 2014))).
79. See Percy, supra note 3, at 224–29; see also, e.g., Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R.
Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573–74 (5th Cir. 2004) (cautioning consideration of extrinsic
evidence “is appropriate only to identify the presence of discrete and undisputed
facts that would preclude plaintiff’s recovery against the in-state defendant”);
Smoot v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 378 F.2d 879, 882 (10th Cir. 1967)
(“[A] federal court [should not] pre-try, as a matter of course, doubtful issues of
fact to determine removability; the issue must be capable of summary determination and be proven with complete certainty.” (citing McLeod v. Cities Serv. Gas
Co., 233 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1956))).
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that any discovery authorized by the federal rules is appropriate.80 House
Report 422 acknowledges that the plausibility standard is more demanding than the pleading standard established by many state court procedural
rules, thereby making it necessary to give the plaintiff an opportunity to
amend the complaint after removal if such amendment is necessary to satisfy the more demanding plausibility standard.81
Finally, subsection (f)(4) provides that if the court finds that a defendant has been fraudulently joined, “it shall dismiss without prejudice the
claims against [that defendant] and shall deny the motion [to remand].”82
Most appellate courts that have addressed the issue have held that dismissal should be without prejudice.83
III. APPLICATION

OF THE

DOCTRINE

TO

DIVERSE IN-STATE DEFENDANTS

Although the fraudulent joinder doctrine has long been applied to
joinder of non-diverse defendants, no appellate court has squarely addressed whether the doctrine also applies to joinder of diverse in-state defendants, and district courts are split on this issue.84 The bill would
resolve this split by clarifying that the doctrine applies equally to joinder of
non-diverse defendants and diverse in-state defendants.
The Seventh Circuit considered whether to extend the fraudulent
joinder doctrine to joinder of diverse in-state defendants in Morris v.
Nuzzo,85 but it expressed concern about reaching the first appellate resolution of an issue not frequently decided by district courts in the absence of
helpful briefing and did not definitively rule on the issue.86 The Seventh
80. See H.R. Rep. No. 114-422, at 16.
81. See id. at 15–16.
82. See H.R. 3624 § 2.
83. See id. at 16.
84. See Morris v. Nuzzo, 718 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2013) (stating it does not
appear that any appellate court has addressed issue and noting district courts are
split); White v. M/Y Senses, LLC, No. 15-cv-01652-JD, 2015 WL 5210328, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2015) (applying fraudulent joinder doctrine to joinder of diverse in-state defendant); Yellen v. Teledne Cont’l Motors, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 2d
490, 501–03 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (applying fraudulent joinder doctrine to joinder of
diverse in-state defendant); Davenport v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., No. 09-cv532-JPG, 2009 WL 4923994, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2009) (holding fraudulent
joinder doctrine does not apply to joinder of diverse in-state defendants); Sargent
v. Cassens Corp., No. 06-cv-1042-MJR, 2007 WL 1673289, at *2 (S.D. Ill. June 7,
2007) (applying fraudulent joinder doctrine to joinder of diverse in-state defendant); Yount v. Shashek, 472 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1059–60 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (holding
fraudulent joinder doctrine does not apply to joinder of diverse in-state defendants). The original bill limited the application of the fraudulent joinder doctrine
to joinder of non-diverse defendants, but it was later amended to also apply to
joinder of diverse in-state defendants, as was suggested by Professor Arthur D.
Hellman in his written testimony to the Senate Judiciary subcommittee at a hearing on the bill. See Hearing on H.R. 3624, supra note 1, at 68–69 (statement of
Professor Hellman).
85. 718 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2013).
86. See id. at 668, 670–71.
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Circuit noted that the Supreme Court, in Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel
Co.,87 held that the “right of removal cannot be defeated by a fraudulent
joinder of a resident defendant having no real connection with the controversy.”88 In Wilson, an Alabama citizen sued his New Jersey employer for
negligence and joined a co-employee who was a citizen of Alabama as an
additional defendant.89 Thus, the defendant-co-employee was not diverse
from the plaintiff and was also an in-state defendant. In Morris, the Seventh Circuit concluded that although the Supreme Court referred to the
co-employee as a resident defendant, the opinion should not be interpreted as extending the fraudulent joinder doctrine to joinder of diverse
in-state defendants because the Court did not specifically consider
whether the fraudulent joinder doctrine applies to joinder of diverse instate defendants, given that the co-employee was a non-diverse
defendant.90
The Seventh Circuit then examined how extending the fraudulent
joinder doctrine to joinder of diverse in-state defendants would impact the
relevant interests at stake—“the plaintiff’s right to select the forum and
the defendants,” “the general interest in confining federal jurisdiction to
its appropriate limits,” “the defendant’s statutory right of removal,” and
the “interest in guarding the removal right against abusive pleading practices.”91 The court noted that in a case involving an out-of-state plaintiff,
an out-of-state defendant, and an in-state defendant, there is no need to
protect the out-of-state defendant from local bias because any local bias
would likely run against the out-of-state plaintiff.92 Nevertheless, the court
observed that extending the doctrine to joinder of diverse in-state defendants was consistent with the doctrine’s “directive that federal courts vigilantly protect the removal right against abusive pleading practices.”93 As
the Seventh Circuit reasonably concluded, the policy concerns motivating
the application of the doctrine to joinder of non-diverse defendants are
equally applicable to joinder of diverse in-state defendants. Just as a plaintiff should not be permitted to defeat a diverse defendant’s right to remove by fraudulently joining a non-diverse defendant, a plaintiff should
not be permitted to defeat a diverse defendant’s right to remove by fraudulently joining a diverse in-state defendant.94
87. 257 U.S. 92 (1921).
88. See Morris, 718 F.3d at 667 (quoting Wilson, 257 U.S. at 97).
89. See Wilson, 257 U.S. at 93–94.
90. See Morris, 718 F.3d at 667.
91. See id. at 668 (citation omitted).
92. See id. at 668–69.
93. See id. at 670.
94. Although the bill would apply the fraudulent joinder doctrine equally to
non-diverse and in-state defendants, the bill refers to non-diverse defendants as
“defendants [who] are citizens of the same [s]tate as one or more plaintiffs” and to
in-state defendants as “properly joined and served” defendants who are “citizens of
the [s]tate in which the action was brought.” See Fraudulent Joinder Prevention
Act of 2016, H.R. 3624, 114th Cong. § 2. House Report 422 notes that the “prop-
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IV. THE “PLAUSIBILITY” STANDARD
A.

Importation of the “Plausibility” Standard from Twombly and Iqbal

The bill provides that fraudulent joinder has occurred if the district
court finds, after reviewing the pleadings, amended pleadings, affidavits,
and other extrinsic evidence submitted by the parties, that “it is not plausible to conclude that applicable [s]tate law would impose liability on that
defendant.”95 Although the bill itself does not define the term “plausible,” House Report 422 indicates that the term is taken from the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal.96 In both cases, the Court addressed the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim and, in doing so, necessarily decided whether the plaintiffs
had stated a claim—whether the plaintiffs had included “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).97
B.

Review of Twombly and Iqbal

In an attempt to understand the manner in which Twombly and Iqbal’s
plausibility pleading standard will inform the application of the plausibility
evidentiary standard contemplated by the bill, it is helpful to review
Twombly and Iqbal. In Twombly, the plaintiffs, telephone and internet subscribers, brought a putative class action against various telecommunications providers, alleging an antitrust conspiracy.98 The complaint alleged
that the defendants engaged in parallel conduct to inhibit upstart companies from competing in their respective service areas and parallel conduct
in refraining from pursuing opportunities in one another’s markets.99
The complaint contained a conclusory allegation that was based upon information and belief that the defendants had entered into a conspiratorial
agreement.100 Antitrust law, however, does not prohibit independent parallel anticompetitive behavior—it requires that the anticompetitive behavior stem from some agreement.101 The Court held that the plaintiffs’
erly joined and served” language was derived from Section 1441(b)(2) and was
included in the bill to “avoid[ ] any implication that the provision resolves [an]
ongoing dispute in the lower [f]ederal courts over the propriety of removal before
service of process on the resident defendants.” See H.R. REP. NO. 114-422, at 10
(2016) (citing Breitweiser v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., No. 3:15-CV-2043-B, 2015
WL 6322625, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2015)). District courts are split over
whether the forum defendant rule bars removal in cases where the plaintiff has
named but not yet served the in-state defendant. See Breitweiser, 2015 WL
6322625, at *2–3 (discussing district court split over “snap removals”).
95. See H.R. 3624 § 2.
96. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-422, at 12–13 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)).
97. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
98. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550–51.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 551.
101. See id. at 553.
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allegations must plausibly suggest that there was an illegal agreement to
engage in such conduct.102 “Asking for plausible grounds to infer an
agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading
stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”103 The Court then
held that the complaint failed to allege a plausible conspiracy because
there was a “natural explanation” for the defendants’ parallel behavior—
each defendant was acting unilaterally to thwart competition and maintain
its regional dominance.104 The Court concluded that “the plaintiffs [ ]
ha[d] not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”105 The Court’s opinion was motivated, at least in part, by its concern
over the growing cost of discovery in complex cases.106 The Court expressed its skepticism about district courts’ ability to reign in discovery
costs and abuse successfully.107
Two years later, in Iqbal, the Supreme Court ruled that the plausibility
standard applied to all federal complaints, not just complaints alleging antitrust violations, and then found the complaint at issue insufficient.108
There, the plaintiff, a Pakistani Muslim who had been arrested in the
United States after 9/11, sued various government officials, including the
former attorney general, alleging that they had “subjected [him] to harsh
conditions of confinement on account of his race, religion, or national
origin.”109 The Court held that the heightened pleading standard articulated in Twombly applies to all cases—not just antitrust cases.110 Pursuant to
the new, two-pronged test to be used when determining whether a pleading states a plausible claim, the district court must first disregard allegations that are bare legal conclusions, as opposed to factual allegations.111
Next, the district court must determine whether the pleading contains sufficient factual allegations to state a plausible claim for relief,112 which the
Court acknowledged would be “a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”113
The Court stated that if the district court may not “infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct,” the pleading fails to state a claim.114 The
102. See id. at 556–57.
103. Id. at 556.
104. See id. at 566–68.
105. See id. at 570.
106. See id. at 558–59.
107. See id. (“[I]t is only by taking care to require allegations that reach the
level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous
expense of discovery . . . .”).
108. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009).
109. See id. at 666.
110. See id. at 678–79 (discussing Court’s approach in Twombly).
111. See id.
112. See id. at 679.
113. See id. (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007)).
114. See id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
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Court observed that plausibility lay somewhere between “probability” and
“sheer possibility,” and further stated that “[a] claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”115
Applying the new test to the case at hand, the Court found that the
plaintiff failed to state a claim. Although the Court found the plaintiff’s
allegations consistent with defendants’ purposefully designating detainees
as “high interest” due to race, religion or national origin, the Court found
that discrimination was not plausible given the “obvious alternative explanation” for the disparate impact upon Arab Muslims—“a legitimate policy
directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of their
suspected link to the attacks.”116 The Court again expressed its belief that
this heightened pleading standard is preferable to the notice pleading regime, which relied more heavily upon the “careful case management” approach.117 The Court held that the plausibility pleading standard was
especially imperative “in suits where Government-official defendants are
entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity” because “[t]he basic
thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials from the concerns of litigation, including ‘avoidance of disruptive discovery.’”118
C.

Criticisms of the Plausibility Pleading Standard

The Twombly and Iqbal opinions have sparked much controversy and
debate among judges, lawyers, legal academics, and those outside of the
legal community.119 The defense bar and the business community lauded
the heightened pleading standard as necessary to reduce the increasing
cost of litigation, screen out frivolous and abusive cases, and “protect [ ]
business interests.”120 The plaintiffs’ bar, civil rights groups, consumer advocates, and environmental groups feared that the heightened pleading
standard would terminate meritorious claims before discovery, undermine
enforcement of the substantive law in the civil rights arena and other areas
115. See id. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556
(2007)).
116. See id. at 682.
117. See id. at 685.
118. See id. (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
119. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Twombly and Iqbal Reconsidered, 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1621, 1621–22 (2012) (characterizing two decisions as “[p]erhaps the most
controversial decisions thus far from the [Roberts Court]” and noting that “scholarly criticism of the two cases has been withering”); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley
to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J.
1, 16–17 (2010) (noting that “sharp debate” and “sharp divide” precipitated by two
cases has culminated in “fever pitch in some quarters” (footnote omitted)); Adam
N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1295–97 (2010) (observing that Twombly and Iqbal have “garnered considerable scholarly attention”); see
also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
120. See Miller, supra note 119, at 16.
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by foreclosing litigation, and increase the cost of litigation to plaintiffs
who are already handicapped in many types of cases due to their asymmetrical access to critical information.121
The plausibility pleading standard was widely criticized for its novel
nature.122 It significantly altered prior pleading practice by adopting a
standard without any precedent as guidance.123 Existing law provided no
guidance as to how convincing the factual allegations must be in order for
the district court to find them plausible. Another widely made criticism
was that the plausibility standard was unpredictable and likely to produce
inconsistent results in similar cases given that lower courts were instructed
to rely upon their judicial experience and common sense.124 This criticism has been borne out in the years since Iqbal, as courts have reached
different results in substantially similar cases.125
Commentators characterized the new test as “destabilizing,” and they
predicted that it would take a decade or more to even have some slight
guidance about sufficient pleadings.126 First, it was argued that because a
large number of district court judges—about 675—would each apply their
own experience and common sense to pleadings in a wide array of cases in
order to determine plausibility, it was unlikely that any settled uniform
application of the standard would emerge.127 It was further argued that,
even though the circuit courts would weigh in on appeals from such cases,
“it [would] likely take years before any given circuit settles on a view of
plausibility applicable to a wide variety of common complaints[,]” given
the particularized nature of the inquiry in each case based upon the specific factual configuration.128
In addition, critics argued that the vague and ambiguous nature of
the test would encourage defendants to file motions to dismiss in more
121. See id.
122. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 832–33 (2010) (characterizing test as “foggy”
and noting that no “prior model ground[s] the new test for convincingness”);
Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 61 (2010) (observing that “ ‘[p]lausibility’ is not a self-defining term”); Miller, supra note 119, at
28–29 (observing that new test “raises novel questions”).
123. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 122, at 832; Dodson, supra note 122,
at 61; Miller, supra note 119, at 29.
124. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 122, at 841 (stating that “measuring
plausibility seems . . . obviously unclear” given that “this measure lies entirely in the
mind of the beholder”); Miller, supra note 119, at 30–31 (noting that “inconsistent
rulings on virtually identical complaints may well be based on individual judges
having quite different subjective views of what allegations are plausible” and observing that four dissenting justices in Iqbal found that complaint stated plausible
claim).
125. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
126. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 122, at 846.
127. See id. at 844.
128. See id. at 845 (citing Anthony Martinez, Note, Plausibility Among the Circuits: An Empirical Survey of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 61 ARK. L. REV. 763, 770
(2009)).
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cases because the defendants would not likely be sanctioned for filing
questionable motions given the unsettled nature of the standard and
would likely benefit by gleaning helpful information from the plaintiffs’
responses to the motions to dismiss and by placing additional cost and
expense on plaintiffs, thereby stretching plaintiffs’ resources.129 Empirical data indicates that there was a substantial increase in the number of
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim after Iqbal—an increase in
counseled cases from 1,672 cases in 2006 to 2,169 cases in 2010.130 The
same data indicates that nearly half of all motions to dismiss were denied
in 2010.131
Many critics further attacked the plausibility pleading standard because they believed that it would decrease plaintiffs’ access to justice in
many types of cases where information is asymmetrical and discovery is
needed in order to plead sufficient facts to state a plausible claim.132 Although empirical data regarding the plausibility pleading standard’s effect
on the rate with which motions to dismiss are granted is debated, one
study found a notable increase in the dismissal rate in employment discrimination and civil rights cases post-Iqbal.133
Finally, critics argued that the plausibility pleading standard is problematic because it is based upon an incorrect proposition that allegations
are not true if they are not plausible.134 In fact, as experience indicates,
things that seem implausible are sometimes true.135 A plaintiff’s claim
should not be barred simply because it appears implausible at the outset of
litigation, particularly if such determination is based upon the plaintiff’s
failure to produce sufficient evidence supporting the claim before
discovery.

129. See id. at 840–41.
130. See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101
VA. L. REV. 2117, 2143–44 (2015).
131. See id. at 2143 tbl.1 (indicating 48% of motions to dismiss for failure to
state claim were denied in 2010); see also William H. J. Hubbard, Testing for Change
in Procedural Standards, with Application to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 42 J. LEGAL
STUD. 35, 57 (2013) (indicating number of Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed after Iqbal
has significantly increased and that slightly more than 48% of such motions were
denied after Iqbal).
132. See Miller, supra note 119, at 40–41.
133. See Reinert, supra note 130; but see Hubbard, supra note 131 (finding that
plausibility pleading standard had little effect on dismissal rates).
134. See, e.g., Arthur H. Bryant, ‘Iqbal’ Brings Seven Years of Bad Luck for Plaintiffs, NAT’L L.J. (May 23, 2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=12
02758245088/Iqbal-Brings-Seven-Years-of-Bad-Luck-for-Plaintiffs?slreturn=201701
25170633 [https://perma.cc/5JQK-ZASL].
135. For example, when Iqbal was decided eight years ago, few people would
have thought it plausible that Donald Trump would be the Republican Party’s
nominee for President or that same-sex marriage would be legal nationwide. See
id.
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Criticisms of the Bill’s Plausibility Standard

Advocates of the bill argue that the plausibility standard is “well understood by federal judges and will not create new litigation or confusion.”136 This view, however, is completely unrealistic. Advocates also
claim that the bill is a “modest tweak to the standard for fraudulent joinder” that “does not expand diversity jurisdiction.”137 As is demonstrated
below, the bill significantly alters the existing fraudulent joinder doctrine
in a manner that will likely increase the number of removals, resulting not
only in increased remand litigation attempting to delineate the contours
of the new fraudulent joinder standards established by the bill, but also a
greater number of successful removals based upon the purposefully more
lenient standard that expands removal jurisdiction.
All of the criticisms that were leveled at the plausibility pleading standard established by Twombly and Iqbal may be validly raised with respect to
the bill’s plausibility standard for fraudulent joinder. It is a novel test with
no precedent as guidance. Although House Report 422 suggests that
Twombly, Iqbal, and their progeny will provide guidance on the application
of the bill’s plausibility standard, such guidance is likely to be of little utility.138 First, as discussed above, courts have not consistently applied the
plausibility pleading standard, in large part because it is very subjective.
Second, and more importantly, Twombly and Iqbal established a pleading
standard, whereas the bill directs district courts to consider extrinsic evidence when determining fraudulent joinder. Third, although the bill directs district courts to consider extrinsic evidence, the bill provides no
guidance as to what evidentiary burden applies—i.e., the weight of evidence required from the plaintiff if the removing defendant challenges
the factual basis for the plaintiff’s claim against the spoiler.139 Presumably, the applicable evidentiary burden is less than the burden applicable at
the summary judgment stage, but determining exactly what burden applies is no easy task in light of the bill’s total lack of guidance. Nor does
the bill indicate what triggers a plaintiff’s obligation to submit evidence to
the district court—does the defendant merely have to challenge the factual basis for plaintiff’s claims against the spoiler, or must the defendant
submit some evidence rebutting plaintiff’s factual allegations in order to
require the plaintiff to respond with evidence in opposition?
In addition, the vague and ambiguous nature of the plausibility standard will encourage and invite defendants to remove cases where joinder
is not fraudulent. Defendants have everything to gain, and very little to
136. See Hearing on H.R. 3624, supra note 1, at 46 (statement of Cary
Silverman).
137. See id. at 35 (statement of Cary Silverman).
138. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-422, at 12–13 (2016).
139. See Hearing on H.R. 3624, supra note 1, at 27–28 (statement of Lonny
Hoffman) (stating that it will take years—if ever—for fraudulent jurisdiction law in
circuits to settle on consistent precedents on which lower courts and litigants can
rely and noting bill fails to define requisite evidentiary burden of proof).
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risk, by removing a case. Even if the case is eventually remanded to state
court, the defendant will have benefitted by the delay in litigation and by
forcing the plaintiff to expend limited resources on remand litigation.140
When the case is remanded back to state court, it will likely be set for trial
at a much later date than the original trial date.141 A delay in the trial
date likely delays settlement negotiations. Defendants generally do not
have to pay pre-judgment interest on tort claims and thereby save interest
costs during the delay.142 Moreover, even though statutory law authorizes
district courts to sanction defendants for wrongfully removing cases,143
such sanctions are extremely rare.144 One study found that the remand
rate for cases erroneously removed based upon alleged fraudulent joinder
was substantially higher than the remand rate for all cases erroneously removed based upon diversity jurisdiction.145 The study concluded that the
“high remand rate” in cases removed based upon allegations of fraudulent
joinder indicates that there is “opportunity for defendants to abuse the
[procedure]” to their advantage.146
Finally, the plausibility standard “raises serious federalism concerns.”147 Diversity jurisdiction authorizes federal courts to decide cases
based upon state law without review by the state’s highest court. In doing
so, diversity jurisdiction thereby intrudes upon the state’s ability to make
the type of policy decisions that the Constitution reserves to the states.148
This intrusion is particularly troublesome when federal courts decide am140. See Theodore Eisenberg & Trevor W. Morrison, Overlooked in the Tort Reform Debate: The Growth of Erroneous Removal, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 551, 560–61
(2005); Christopher R. McFadden, Removal, Remand, and Reimbursement Under 28
U.S.C. § 1447(C), 87 MARQ. L. REV. 123, 133 (2003); E. Farish Percy, The Tedford
Equitable Exception Permitting Removal of Diversity Cases After One Year: A Welcome Development or the Opening of Pandora’s Box?, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 146, 180–81 (2011);
Christopher Terranova, Erroneous Removal as a Tool for Silent Tort Reform: An Empirical Analysis of Fee Awards and Fraudulent Joinder, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 799,
799–800 (2008).
141. See Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 140, at 561–62; Percy, supra note
140, at 181.
142. See McFadden, supra note 140, at 133; Percy, supra note 140, at 181.
143. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2012).
144. See McFadden, supra note 140, at 125; Percy, supra note 140, at 181 (noting that in eighty cases that were remanded after defendants erroneously removed
based upon Tedford equitable exception, court sanctioned defendant for wrongful
removal in only one case).
145. See Terranova, supra note 140, at 828–32 (noting one set of data yielded
50% remand rate for removals involving alleged fraudulent joinder compared to
27% remand rate for removals involving diversity jurisdiction and noting another
set of data yielded 59% remand rate, making it 6.7 times more likely case removed
based upon alleged fraudulent joinder in comparison to cases removed based
upon diversity jurisdiction).
146. See id. at 799, 831, 837–38.
147. See Hellman, supra note 8, at 43.
148. See supra notes 85–94 and accompanying text.
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biguous or novel issues of state law.149 For these reasons, the Supreme
Court has long held that the statutes conferring original and removal jurisdiction based upon diversity should be strictly construed.150 Due to this
precedent and underlying federalism concerns, most circuit courts hold
that the defendant’s burden in establishing fraudulent joinder is a heavy
one and that any contested issues of fact or ambiguities in state law must
be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.151
House Report 422 indicates that when the removing defendant challenges the legal basis for the plaintiff’s claims against the spoiler, the district court should consider “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that
the state courts would impose liability.”152 As was intended by the bill’s
drafters, this removal standard is much easier to demonstrate than any of
the standards currently applied by circuit courts. In many cases where the
plaintiff’s claim against the spoiler is not frivolous, it may well be deemed
implausible based upon the district court’s prediction that the state court
is likely to resolve a novel or ambiguous issue of state law against the plaintiff. This raises serious federalism concerns because the federal court
would necessarily be intruding upon the state court’s authority to decide
state substantive law, and it would be doing so with respect to a claim over
which it may not have jurisdiction. If the plaintiff’s claim against the
spoiler has a reasonable legal basis—if it is supported by existing law or a
non-frivolous argument that the law should be changed—then the entire
case is one that should be tried in state court.153 In other words, the most
149. See supra notes 87–94 and accompanying text. When federal courts decide novel issues of state law, they sometimes err in predicting state law and therefore not only retard the development of state law, but also leave the losing party
feeling deprived of justice. See id.
150. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1941)
(observing that federalism concerns require strict construction of removal statutes); Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934) (“Due regard for the rightful independence of state governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that
they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the
statute has defined.” (citing Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525 (1932))).
151. See, e.g., Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 356 (2d Cir. 2011); Travis
v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 649 (5th Cir. 2003); Montano v. Allstate Indemnity, No. 992225 (10th Cir. Apr. 14, 2000); Alexander v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 940,
948–49 (6th Cir. 1994).
152. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-422, at 12–13 (2016).
153. When evaluating claims of legal inadequacy, most courts have held that
the inquiry is not as demanding as the inquiry when ruling upon a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion because in cases involving uncertain issues of state law, the court has to
determine only whether there is a reasonable basis for the claim, not whether the
claim is recognized by existing law. See Percy, supra note 3, at 222 n.225 (collecting
cases); see also Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806, 810–11 (8th Cir. 2003)
(holding that in removal proceedings, district “court has no responsibility to definitively settle the ambiguous question of state law”); Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
187 F.3d 422, 425 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that “truly ‘novel’ issue . . . cannot be
the basis for finding fraudulent joinder”); Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1539
(11th Cir. 1997) (holding that “any ambiguity or doubt about the substantive state
law favors remand”); Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 853 (3d Cir. 1992)
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appropriate standard for determining fraudulent joinder based upon legal
inadequacy is one akin to the Rule 11 standard that focuses on whether
the complaint’s allegations “are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law.”154
House Report 422 indicates that when a removing defendant challenges the factual basis for the plaintiff’s claim against the spoiler, the
court should “determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the
plaintiff can muster factual support for each element of the state-law
claim.”155 First, the plausibility standard should not be equated with a
“reasonable likelihood” standard, given that Twombly and Iqbal both hold
that plausibility does not require probability.156 As is further argued in
the Section below, the bill’s plausibility standard comes dangerously close
to requiring district courts, which are directed to consider extrinsic evidence when determining whether the plaintiff’s claim against the spoiler
is plausible, to determine the merits of a state law claim over which they
have no jurisdiction.
Additional federalism concerns arise because the bill not only intrudes upon the state’s ability to establish state substantive law, but it also
intrudes upon the state’s ability to establish state procedural law. Many
states have not adopted the Iqbal heightened pleading standard. The bill
clearly contemplates that when a case is removed to federal court based
upon fraudulent joinder, the plaintiff’s complaint must satisfy the federal
standard, even though it may be remanded back to state court for lack of
jurisdiction.157 Many courts applying the fraudulent joinder doctrine in
the wake of Iqbal recognized the federalism issues raised by imposing federal pleadings standards upon plaintiffs when determining fraudulent
joinder and accordingly determined that the state court pleading standard
controls.158
(holding that “[a] claim which can be dismissed only after an intricate analysis of
state law is not so wholly insubstantial and frivolous that it may be disregarded for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction”).
154. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2); see also Percy supra note at 3, at 218–25 (arguing that “reasonable basis for the claim test” is test that best determines fraudulent
joinder and also accommodates federalism concerns); but see Underwood, supra
note 2, at 1093–94 (arguing against Rule 11 proxy for fraudulent joinder and suggesting that abrogation of voluntary/involuntary rule would facilitate reform of
fraudulent joinder).
155. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-422, at 13.
156. “Reasonable likelihood” could easily be interpreted to require a significant degree of probability, even if such degree is not more than fifty percent.
157. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-422, at 16 (noting bill contemplates plaintiffs
amending pleadings after removal to satisfy higher federal standard).
158. See, e.g., Manley v. Ford Motor Co., 17 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1383 (N.D. Ga.
2014) (“[D]istrict courts should not disregard allegations in the complaint just
because they do not comply with the federal pleading standards under Twombly
and Iqbal . . . . because the relevant question for fraudulent-joinder purposes is
whether the plaintiff has an arguable basis for holding the resident defendant liable under state, not federal, law.”); Wong v. Michaels Stores, Inc., No.
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Advocates of the bill argue that the plausibility standard does not
raise federalism concerns because Congress has the authority to expand
removal jurisdiction to the extent such jurisdiction is consistent with the
Constitution.159 One commentator acknowledged that this “den[ial] [of]
state courts[‘] [ ] ability to decide and, ultimately, to shape state law” is “a
routine feature of diversity jurisdiction,” and therefore suggested that because diversity jurisdiction already raises federalism concerns, there is no
harm in extending removal jurisdiction.160 To the contrary, although
Congress may constitutionally extend removal jurisdiction by redefining
fraudulent joinder, the question at issue is whether it should. Any expansion of removal jurisdiction based upon diversity will result in federal
courts deciding more cases based upon state law, thereby exacerbating the
federal courts’ intrusion into the policy decisions generally reserved for
the states.161
Proponents of the plausibility standard also argue that this more lenient standard for fraudulent joinder is necessary to protect in-state residents and local businesses who are sometimes joined as spoilers from
weak claims.162 This rationale “played no role in the Supreme Court decisions that established the fraudulent joinder doctrine.”163 Not only does
this justification for the expansion of removal jurisdiction raise federalism
concerns as previously discussed, it also indicates a complete distrust of
state courts. It is not sufficient to argue that further intrusion by federal
1:11–cv–00162 AWI JLT, 2012 WL 718646, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2012) (“Twombly
and Iqbal clarify the federal pleading standard set forth by Rule 8(a) but make no
comment as to the propriety of pleading under California law.”); DNJ Logistic
Grp., Inc. v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 160, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)
(“The more logical choice . . . is to apply state pleading standards, because ‘the
purpose of a fraudulent joinder analysis is to determine whether a state court might
permit a plaintiff to proceed with his claims . . . .’ ” (quoting Kuperstein v. Hoffman-Laroche, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 2d 467, 471–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2006))); see also Hearing
on H.R. 3624, supra note 1, at 32 (statement of Lonny Hoffman) (noting bill ignores longstanding federalism concerns by directing district courts to conduct
merits inquiries and by imposing federal pleading standards on state courts).
159. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 3624, supra note 1, at 42–43, 59 (statement of
Cary Silverman); Hellman, supra note 8, at 42–43.
160. See Hellman, supra note 8, at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text; see also Hellman, supra
note 8, at 43 (arguing federalism concerns should not prevent Congress from expanding removal jurisdiction because expanded removal jurisdiction will not
“deny state courts the ability to decide and, ultimately, to shape state law” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
162. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 3624, supra note 1, at 17 (statement of Elizabeth
Milito) (stating reform of fraudulent joinder doctrine is necessary to protect small
local businesses that may be joined as defendants from weak claims because of
“inevitable risk that a plaintiff might prevail if the case goes before a sympathetic
jury or an errant judge”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 114-422, at 4; Hellman, supra note
8, at 41–42 (arguing expansion of removal jurisdiction to protect in-state residents
and local businesses from weak claims is “legitimate exercise of congressional
power over federal-court jurisdiction”).
163. See Hellman, supra note 8, at 41.
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courts into determining cases based upon state law is warranted simply
because some states may not have adopted rules or practices that are advantageous to defendants. States should be able to exercise their public
policy making authority to determine whether they want to adopt the
Daubert standard for admissibility of evidence, the Twombly and Iqbal pleading standard, proportionality limitations on discovery, or other rules or
standards that have been established in federal courts.164 That proponents of the bill are justifying expansion of diversity jurisdiction based
upon dissatisfaction with state practice should cause Congress to pause
and seriously consider the federalism concerns.
V.

CONSIDERATION

OF

EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE

The bill’s second-most notable provision not only authorizes, but also
directs district courts to consider extrinsic evidence when determining
fraudulent joinder. The bill provides that, when ruling upon a motion to
remand in a case involving alleged fraudulent joinder the court “shall consider the pleadings, affidavits, and other evidence submitted by the parties.”165 House Report 422 indicates that the proceeding to determine
fraudulent joinder will be similar to a summary judgment proceeding pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b).166 Unlike Rule 56, however, the bill does not explicitly require that the evidence considered in
the fraudulent joinder context be admissible at trial.167 More importantly,
however, the bill places no limitation upon district courts’ consideration
of extrinsic evidence or the degree to which discovery on the merits may
proceed while the case is pending in district court.
Although many circuit courts have explicitly held that courts may
pierce the pleadings and consider extrinsic evidence when determining
fraudulent joinder, most have endorsed some form of limited piercing
and have strongly cautioned against the type of broad piercing that would
convert the jurisdictional inquiry into an inquiry on the merits of the state
law claim.168 A few courts, however, appear to endorse broad piercing of
164. See Hellman, supra note 8 at 44, n.96 (arguing reform of fraudulent joinder doctrine is warranted because state courts have not followed federal courts’
lead in adopting rules and practices that decrease pressure on defendants to settle
weak claims).
165. See Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016, H.R. 3624, 114th Cong.
§ 2.
166. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-422, at 16.
167. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2).
168. See, e.g., In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 219–20 (3d Cir. 2006) (authorizing
“limited look outside the pleadings” to determine whether claim against spoiler
was time-barred because such piercing did not step “from the threshold jurisdictional issue into a decision on the merits” because “a statute of limitations defense
is not a merits-based defense”); Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir.
1997) (noting “the jurisdictional inquiry ‘must not subsume substantive determination’ ” and stressing that “the trial court must be certain of its jurisdiction before
embarking upon a safari in search of a judgment on the merits” (quoting B., Inc. v.
Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 548–50 (5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981))); Smoot v.
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the pleadings, thereby condoning a procedure that closely resembles summary judgment.169 For example, in Dodd v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc.,170 the
Tenth Circuit held that “upon specific allegations of fraudulent joinder
the court may pierce the pleadings, consider the entire record, and determine the basis of joinder by any means available.”171
In Smallwood,172 the Fifth Circuit addressed this issue with the most
detail of any circuit court. There, the court substantially limited the extent to which a district court may pierce the pleadings when determining
fraudulent joinder. The court held that piercing is appropriate only in a
narrow range of cases where the plaintiff has stated a claim against the
spoiler but “misstated or omitted discrete facts that would determine the
propriety of joinder.”173 The court suggested that discrete facts are facts
that do not go directly toward the merits of the claim, such as whether a
non-diverse doctor actually treated the plaintiff or whether a non-diverse
pharmacist actually filled the plaintiff’s prescription.174 In such cases, the
district court has discretion to conduct a summary inquiry.175 The court
further held:
We emphasize that any piercing of the pleadings should not entail substantial hearings. Discovery by the parties should not be
allowed except on a tight judicial tether, sharply tailored to the
question at hand, and only after a showing of its necessity. Attempting to proceed beyond this summary process carries a
heavy risk of moving the court beyond jurisdiction and into a
resolution of the merits, as distinguished from an analysis of the
court’s diversity jurisdiction by a simple and quick exposure of
the chances of the claim against the in-state defendant alleged to
be improperly joined. Indeed, the inability to make the requisite
decision in a summary manner itself points to an inability of the
removing party to carry its burden.176

Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 378 F.2d 879, 882 (10th Cir. 1967) (“[A] federal
court [should not] pre-try, as a matter of course, doubtful issues of fact to determine removability; the issue must be capable of summary determination and be
proven with complete certainty.” (citing McLeod v. Cities Serv. Gas Co., 233 F.2d
242 (10th Cir. 1956))). For more discussion of the degree to which courts pierce
the pleadings and consider extrinsic evidence when determining fraudulent joinder, see Percy supra note 3, at 224–29; Underwood, supra note 2, at 1056–081.
169. See Underwood, supra note 2, at 1056–81.
170. 329 F.2d 82 (10th Cir. 1964).
171. See id. at 85 (citations omitted).
172. 385 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2004).
173. See Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004).
174. See id. at 573 n.12.
175. See id.
176. Id. at 574.
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Given that the Fifth Circuit, at the time, had experienced the highest
number of removals based upon fraudulent joinder,177 its limitations on
piercing and discovery were presumably tailored to prevent the type of
“runaway” fraudulent joinder proceedings that had been occurring.178
The Fifth Circuit’s greater experience and familiarity with fraudulent joinder suggests that its limited piercing approach should be given some degree of deference.179
This type of limited pleading is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
holding in Wecker.180 There, the Court affirmed removal in a case where
the district court considered extrinsic evidence—an affidavit establishing
that the non-diverse defendant, a co-employee of the plaintiff, had no responsibility for the design of the furnace in question or for supervising the
plaintiff.181 In light of the plaintiff’s failure to rebut such evidence, the
Court held that removal was proper.182 The issue involved, however, did
not concern the merits of the plaintiff’s independent negligence claims
against his diverse employer. Thus, Wecker and Smallwood authorize limited
piercing for the purpose of demonstrating a discrete issue—whether the
spoiler owed any duty to the plaintiff.
Given the federalism concerns raised by removal diversity jurisdiction,
the Fifth Circuit’s limited piercing rule appropriately balances a diverse
defendant’s right to remove with the plaintiff’s right to have a state court
determine the merits of a state law claim against a non-diverse defendant.
Even though federal courts have jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction,
they generally must find jurisdiction before determining the merits of a
case.183 As the Supreme Court held in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envi177. The Fifth Circuit has decided many more fraudulent joinder cases than
any other circuit court, as district courts within the Fifth Circuit have decided
many more fraudulent cases than district courts in any other circuit. See Percy,
supra note 3, at 240–41 app. (indicating that, from 1990–2004, Fifth Circuit decided 56 of total 116 appellate cases involving fraudulent joinder, while district
courts within Fifth Circuit decided 918 of 1557 total cases involving fraudulent
joinder during same time period); Terranova, supra note 140, at 829–32.
178. See Percy, supra note 3, at 228; see also James F. Archibald, III, Note, Reintroducing “Fraud” to the Doctrine of Fraudulent Joinder, 78 VA. L. REV. 1377, 1392
(1992) (commenting upon “runaway” fraudulent joinder proceedings that
amounted to plenary trials on merits). The Fifth Circuit’s prior practice of authorizing broad piercing of the pleadings has been characterized as the “most radical
[ ] when it comes to enabling district courts to consider evidence in the context of
a fraudulent joinder inquiry.” See Matthew J. Richardson, Clarifying and Limiting
Fraudulent Joinder, 58 FLA. L. REV. 119, 151 (2006).
179. Even though seven judges dissented from the majority’s opinion in
Smallwood, the dissenting opinions indicated disagreement with the Fifth Circuit’s
common defense rule, not its limited piercing approach.
180. 204 U.S. 176 (1907).
181. See Wecker v. Nat’l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 186 (1907).
182. See id. 184–85.
183. See United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 291
(1947).
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ronment,184 a court that decides the meaning of “a state or federal law
when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition . . . act[ing] ultra
vires.”185
The difficulty with respect to fraudulent joinder is that it requires the
district court to assess the merits of the plaintiff’s claims against the
spoiler. By using a “reasonable basis for the claim” standard that focuses
on whether there is a colorable basis for the claim, and by employing limited piercing, district courts can effectively make a cursory determination
of whether there is a reasonable basis for the claim against the spoiler
without finally resolving the merits of the claim. Given that the bill places
no limitation whatsoever on consideration of extrinsic evidence or on the
scope of discovery while the motion to remand is pending, there is every
reason to be concerned that fraudulent joinder decisions would impermissibly cross the threshold from jurisdictional determinations to merits determinations.186 Proponents of the bill appear to acknowledge that the
plausibility standard in conjunction with the provision authorizing broad
piercing of the pleadings will require the district court to make a meritstype analysis because the courts will be required to “evaluate whether the
plaintiff has stated a ‘plausible claim for relief’ against the non-diverse
defendant.”187
As previously argued by this author, the “reasonable basis for the
claim” test applied in a manner that allows limited consideration of extrinsic evidence is the combination of standard and procedure that best accommodates federalism concerns.188 In cases where the removing
defendant challenges the legal adequacy of the plaintiff’s claim against the
spoiler, the “reasonable basis for the claim” test simply examines whether
the plaintiff has a non-frivolous legal argument in support of the claim. It
does not require the district court to resolve any novel or ambiguous issues
of state law. In cases where the removing defendant challenges the factual
basis for the plaintiff’s claim against the spoiler, the “reasonable basis for
claim” test does not require the district court to weigh the merits of the
claim against the spoiler. In combination with a limited piercing procedure, it authorizes a court to consider extrinsic evidence in a narrow range
of cases where doing so is least likely to resemble a merits-type decision.
184. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
185. See id. at 101–02.
186. See Hearing on H.R. 3624, supra note 1, at 31 (statement of Lonny Hoffman) (stating that “requiring extensive merits inquiry at the jurisdictional stage
would be inconsistent with all other kinds of subject matter jurisdiction inquiries”).
It has been argued that the district court would not be determining the merits of
the plaintiff’s claim because the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim
against the spoiler is without prejudice, thereby allowing the plaintiff to refile the
claim against the spoiler in a separate action in state court. See Hellman, supra
note 8, at 43.
187. See Hearing on H.R. 3624, supra note 1, at 46 (statement of Cary
Silverman).
188. See Percy, supra note 3, at 216–29.
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Affirmative Defenses

As an additional basis for fraudulent joinder, the bill includes a finding by the district court that “[s]tate or [f]ederal law clearly bars all claims
in the complaint against [the] defendant.”189 This provision resolves a
split among lower courts over whether affirmative defenses may be considered when determining fraudulent joinder and also abrogates the “common defense” rule established by the Fifth Circuit in Smallwood.190
Many circuit courts have explicitly authorized consideration of affirmative defenses when ruling on fraudulent joinder. For example, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a plaintiff’s motion to
remand after finding that the plaintiff fraudulently joined the non-diverse
defendant because the plaintiff’s claim against such defendant was clearly
preempted by the Communications Act.191 Similarly, the Third Circuit
held that the district court properly denied plaintiffs’ motion to remand
because “there could be no debate” that plaintiffs’ claims against the nondiverse physicians were “time-barred as a matter of law.”192 In so ruling,
however, the court cautioned that the “district court must rule out any
possibility that a state court would entertain the cause” and further cautioned against stepping from the “threshold jurisdictional issue into a decision on the merits.”193 The court further held that a district court may
take a “limited look outside the pleadings” to determine if the claim
against the spoiler is clearly barred by a statute of limitations defense, noting that such defense is not a “merits-based defense to the plaintiff’s
case.”194 Although the Ninth Circuit held that a statute of limitations defense may be considered when determining fraudulent joinder if it is “perfectly clear” that the claim against the spoiler is time-barred, it held in a
different case that an implied preemption defense was of a different character because it relates to the merits of a plaintiff’s claim, unlike a statute
of limitations defense.195 The Eleventh Circuit has suggested that affirmative defenses may sometimes be the basis for finding fraudulent joinder
but not when the application of the defense requires the district court to
189. See Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016, H.R. 3624, 114th Cong.
§ 2.
190. See Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2004); H.R.
REP. NO. 114-422, at 14–15 (2016) (stating bill abrogates Smallwood “common defense” rule).
191. See Johnson v. Am. Towers, LLC, 781 F.3d 693, 705–06 (4th Cir. 2015).
192. See In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 219 (3d Cir. 2006).
193. See id. (quoting Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 112 (3d Cir.
1990)).
194. See id. at 220.
195. Compare Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1319–20 (9th Cir.
1998), with Hunter v. Phillip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2009).
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decide an unclear issue under state law.196 The Fifth Circuit also allows
consideration of affirmative defenses when considering fraudulent
joinder.197
While a handful of district courts have refused to consider fraudulent
joinder based upon affirmative defenses, most have done so, reasoning
that the particular affirmative defense at issue delved into the merits of a
plaintiff’s claim against the spoiler.198 Thus, to the extent there is some
slight disagreement over whether affirmative defenses may be considered
when determining fraudulent joinder, the bill reasonably resolves such
disagreement. As has been recognized by numerous circuit courts, however, affirmative defenses should be the basis for finding fraudulent joinder only when it is perfectly clear that the claim against the spoiler is
barred by the defense, and a district court should not engage a merits
determination when considering affirmative defenses.
B.

Common Defenses

The bill’s provisions abrogate Smallwood’s common defense rule by
making it clear that, in determining fraudulent joinder, the district court
is to consider only the claim against the spoiler, not the claim against the
diverse defendant.199 In Smallwood, the plaintiff filed negligence claims
against a diverse railroad and the non-diverse Mississippi Department of
Transportation (MDOT) for injuries she sustained at a railroad crossing.200 Both defendants answered, raising the affirmative defense that the
196. See Florence v. Crescent Res., LLC, 484 F.3d 1293, 1298–99 (11th Cir.
2009) (considering fraudulent joinder based upon statutory affirmative defense
but holding court should not resolve unanswered questions of state law regarding
affirmative defense).
197. See, e.g., Boone v. Citigroup, Inc., 416 F.3d 382, 390–92 (5th Cir. 2005)
(finding fraudulent joinder based upon statute of limitations); Smallwood v. Ill.
Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 574–76 (5th Cir. 2004) (considering whether joinder
was fraudulent based upon federal preemption); Carriere v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
893 F.2d 98, 100–02 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding fraudulent joinder based upon nondiverse defendants’ immunity pursuant to state statutory law); Green v. Amerada
Hess Corp., 707 F.2d 201, 205–08 (5th Cir. 1983) (considering res judicata and
collateral estoppel when determining fraudulent joinder).
198. See, e.g., City of Columbus, Ohio v. Sunstar Columbus, Inc., No. 2:15-cv1864, 2015 WL 5775532, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 2, 2015); Vincent v. First Republic
Bank Inc., No. C 10-01212 WHA, 2010 WL 1980223, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 17,
2010).
199. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-422 at 14–15 (2016). The common defense rule
has been extended to common defects. See Percy, supra note 3, at 234. A common
defect is similar to a common defense in that it equally disposes of the claim
against the diverse defendant and the spoiler. For example, assume a plaintiff
sued a diverse drug manufacturer for defectively designing a pharmaceutical drug
and a non-diverse physician for negligently prescribing the drug, which allegedly
caused the plaintiff heart problems. If the diverse drug manufacturer removes,
arguing there was fraudulent joinder because the heart problems were preexisting,
that defect equally disposes of the plaintiff’s claims against both defendants.
200. See Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 571–72 (5th Cir. 2004)
(providing spirited 9-7 en banc decision on consideration of common defenses).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss1/6

32

Percy: The Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016: Moving the Law in

2017]

FRAUDULENT JOINDER PREVENTION

245

plaintiff’s “claims . . . were preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety
Act.”201 The railroad removed, arguing that MDOT was fraudulently
joined because the plaintiff’s claim against MDOT was preempted.202 The
district court agreed and dismissed MDOT and then granted summary
judgment in favor of the railroad based upon the preemption defense.203
On appeal, the court held that a finding of fraudulent joinder cannot
be based upon a common defense—a defense that equally disposes of the
claim against the non-diverse defendant and the diverse defendant.204
The court reasoned that the railroad’s preemption defense went to the
validity of the entire case rather than the propriety of the plaintiff’s joinder of MDOT.205 In so ruling, the court relied upon the Supreme Court’s
holding in Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Cockrell.206 In Cockrell, the
plaintiff sued his intestate’s diverse railroad employer and two non-diverse
co-employees of the intestate, alleging that the co-employees negligently
caused the intestate’s death and that the railroad was vicariously liable.207
The railroad removed, arguing that the plaintiff fraudulently joined the
non-diverse co-employees because the co-employees were not negligent.208 The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s joinder of the nondiverse co-employees was not fraudulent because the railroad’s contention
“went to the merits of the action as an entirety,” rather than joinder of the
non-diverse defendants.209
As no negligent act or omission personal to the railway company
was charged, and its liability, like that of the two employees, was,
in effect, predicated upon the alleged negligence of the latter,
the showing manifestly went to the merits of the action as an entirety, and not to the joinder; that is to say, it indicated that the
plaintiff’s case was ill founded as to all the defendants. Plainly,
this was not such a showing as to engender or compel the conclusion that the two employees were wrongfully brought into a controversy which did not concern them.210
In later cases, the Supreme Court refused to find fraudulent joinder
based upon the same reasoning.211
201. See id. at 572.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 574–76.
205. See id. at 574.
206. 232 U.S. 146 (1914).
207. See id. at 150.
208. See id. at 150–51.
209. See id. at 152–53.
210. Id. at 153.
211. See S. Ry. Co. v. Lloyd, 239 U.S. 496, 500 (1916) (holding “a traverse of
the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s petition . . . in [a] way [that] undertak[es] to try
the merits of a cause of action” cannot establish right to remove (citing Cockrell,
232 U.S. 146)); Chi., Rock Island, & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Whiteaker, 239 U.S. 421, 425
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In Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corp.,212 the Third Circuit refused to find
fraudulent joinder based upon the diverse defendant’s argument that the
plaintiff’s claims against the spoilers were barred because the plaintiff had
released them.213 The court cited Cockrell and noted that the defense
upon which the plaintiff’s alleged fraudulent joinder was based would
equally dispose of the claims against the spoiler and the diverse defendant.214 Thus, the court determined that the defenses “went to the merits
of the [entire case],” rather than the joinder of the spoilers.215 The Ninth
and Seventh Circuits, however, have found fraudulent joinder based upon
common defenses. In Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co.,216 the Ninth Circuit
found fraudulent joinder in a case where the statute of limitations defense
equally disposed of the claims against the diverse and non-diverse defendants.217 Similarly, in LeBlang Motors, Ltd. v. Subaru of America, Inc.,218 the
Seventh Circuit found fraudulent joinder based upon the statute of limitations applicable to fraud claims, even though it equally disposed of the
entire case.219
The current purpose of the fraudulent joinder doctrine is to thwart a
plaintiff’s “devices to prevent removal.”220 Generally, if the plaintiff’s
claim against the spoiler lacks a reasonable basis, then it is fair to presume
the plaintiff joined the spoiler for the purpose of preventing removal of
the plaintiff’s claim against the diverse defendant. If, however, the same
defense bars the plaintiff’s claim against the spoiler and the diverse defendant, the basis for that inference is no longer apparent.221 One cannot
conclude that the plaintiff fraudulently joined the spoiler simply because
the entire case lacks merit. While Congress may enact jurisdictional statutes within the confines of the Constitution, it should carefully consider
all rationales for enlarging diversity jurisdiction. Abrogation of the com-

(1915) (finding contention that non-diverse employee who was in no way negligent had been fraudulently joined concerned merits of entire case as opposed to
joinder because claim against diverse railroad was based upon vicarious liability).
212. 913 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1990).
213. See id. at 112–13.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 113 (quoting Chesapeake & O.R. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146,
151 (1914)).
216. 139 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1998).
217. See id. at 1315–17, 1320.
218. 148 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 1998).
219. See id. at 692.
220. See Wecker v. Nat’l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 186 (1907).
221. The objective fraudulent joinder test focused on whether there is a reasonable basis for the claim is a proxy for determining whether the plaintiff subjectively joined the spoiler to prevent removal. See Percy, supra note 59, at 579. If the
entire case lacks merits, there is no objective basis upon which to infer the plaintiff’s fraudulent motive.
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mon defense rule not only raises serious federalism concerns, but it also
suggests total distrust of the state courts.222
As has been pointed out by one commentator, Congress is not bound
by precedent establishing the common defense rule because it may enact
jurisdictional statutes to the extent they are consistent with the Constitution.223 As argued above, however, simply because Congress may redefine
fraudulent joinder does not mean that it should. Abrogation of the common defense rule would mean that cases lacking complete diversity may
be removed if the case is totally devoid of merit due to a common defense
or common defect. Such an abrogation would significantly increase removal jurisdiction and thereby further add to the federalism concerns
raised by the bill. In addition, as do other features of the bill, the abrogation of the common defense signals a distrust of state courts.
VII. THE “LACK

OF

GOOD FAITH INTENT

TO

PROSECUTE” STANDARD

Another basis for fraudulent joinder under the bill is a finding by the
district court that “objective evidence clearly demonstrates that there is no
good faith intention to prosecute the action against that defendant or to
seek a joint judgment including that defendant.”224 Although some lower
courts have interpreted Supreme Court precedent as authorizing removal
based upon such a finding, the Supreme Court has never found fraudulent joinder based upon evidence of the plaintiff’s subjective intent. In
Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co.,225 the Court found that the plaintiff
fraudulently joined his non-diverse co-employee as an additional defendant because the joinder was “without any reasonable basis in fact and
without any purpose to prosecute the cause in good faith against the coemploy[ee].”226 In so holding, the Court found no reasonable basis for
the plaintiff’s claims against his co-employee because the co-employee was
not even present when the plaintiff was injured and was not responsible
for the plaintiff’s injuries.227
In Chicago, Rock Island, & Pacific Railway Co. v. Schwyhart,228 the Court
held that “[o]n the question of removal[,] we have not to consider more
than whether there was a real intention to get a joint judgment, and
whether there was colorable ground for it.”229 The Court rejected the
removing defendant’s argument that joinder was fraudulent because the
spoiler would not be able to satisfy any judgment and further held that if
222.
raised by
223.
224.
§ 2.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

For a more thorough analysis of the common defense rule and the issues
its critics, see Percy, supra note 3, at 230–39.
See Hellman, supra note 8, at 38.
See Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016, H.R. 3624, 114th Cong.
257 U.S.
See id. at
See id. at
227 U.S.
See id. at

92 (1921).
98.
97–98.
184 (1913).
194.
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the plaintiff’s claim against the spoiler is colorable, the plaintiff’s motive
for joining the spoiler is irrelevant and does not render joinder fraudulent.230 “Again, the motive of the plaintiff, taken by itself, does not affect
the right to remove. If there is a joint liability, he has an absolute right to
enforce it, whatever the reason that makes him wish to assert the right.”231
Even though the Court used some language to suggest a subjective test in
these two cases—“purpose to prosecute the cause in good faith” and “real
intention to get a joint judgment,”232 the Court clearly stated in Schwyart
and numerous other cases that the plaintiff’s subjective motive is immaterial as long as there is a reasonable basis for the plaintiff’s claim against
the spoiler.233 Some lower courts have interpreted this precedent as establishing two alternative grounds for finding fraudulent joinder—no reasonable basis for the claim against the spoiler or no subjective intent on
the part of the plaintiff to obtain a judgment against the spoiler.234 Other
courts, however, have interpreted this precedent as establishing a purely
objective test focused on the basis for the claim.235
Even if existing common law does not support use of a subjective test,
Congress has the authority to establish one by statute. Such a subjective
test, however, is likely to be costly and ineffective. The provision authorizes a district court to consider objective evidence of the plaintiff’s subjective intent. As noted in House Report 422, “the court should not inquire
into the subjective intent of the plaintiff or his or her lawyer.”236 House
230. See id.
231. See id. at 193 (citing Chi., Burlington, & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Willard, 220
U.S. 413, 427 (1911); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Sheegog, 215 U.S. 308, 316 (1909)).
232. See id. at 194.
233. See Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183, 189–90 (1931)
(“[T]he motive of a plaintiff in joining defendants is immaterial, provided there is
in good faith a cause of action against those joined.”); Chi., Rock Island, & Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Whiteaker, 239 U.S. 421, 424–25 (1915) (relying on Schwyart’s holding that
plaintiff’s motive does not render joinder fraudulent); Chi., Rock Island, & Pac.
Ry. Co. v. Dowell, 229 U.S. 102, 114 (1913) (“If the plaintiff had a cause of action
which was joint, and had elected to sue both tort feasors in one action, his motive
in doing so is of no importance.”); Chi., Burlington, & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Willard,
220 U.S. 413, 427 (1911) (holding plaintiff’s preferences or motives were immaterial to fraudulent joinder determination); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Sheegog, 215 U.S.
308, 318 (1909) (holding that if plaintiffs can rightfully sue two tortfeasors who are
subject to joint liability, “no motive could make his choice a fraud”).
234. See, e.g., Barlow v. Crane-Houdaille, Inc., No. WDQ-12-1780, 2015 WL
11070882, at *7–8 (D. Md. Oct. 8, 2015) (concluding Supreme Court precedent
supports subjective “intent test”).
235. See, e.g., Selman v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 11-cv-1400-HU, 2011 WL 6655354, at
*6–9 (D. Or. Dec. 16, 2011) (concluding Supreme Court precedent does not support subjective “intent test”).
236. See H.R. Rep. No. 114-422, at 15. The original bill was amended so as to
limit the court’s consideration to objective evidence. The amendment may have
been in response to concerns that defendants would seek discovery from the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s lawyer regarding the plaintiff’s subjective motive for joining
the spoiler. See, e.g., Selman, 2011 WL 6655354, at *11 (concluding subjective “intent test” “would invite potentially expensive and intrusive collateral discovery and
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Report 422 indicates that objective evidence can consist of the plaintiff’s
“collective litigation actions.”237 Such objective evidence might include:
(i) the plaintiff’s failure to serve the jurisdictional spoiler, (ii) the plaintiff’s failure to obtain a default judgment against the jurisdictional
spoiler,238 (iii) the plaintiff’s failure to propound written discovery requests to the spoiler,239 (iv) the plaintiff’s failure to depose the spoiler,
(v) the plaintiff’s failure to designate an expert witness in support of the
claim against the spoiler, and (vi) the plaintiff’s failure to respond in opposition to a dispositive motion made by the spoiler. Given that most removals and succeeding motions to remand are filed at the outset of
litigation due to statutory time periods, little objective evidence regarding
the plaintiff’s subjective intent will exist at the time district courts rule
upon the large majority of motions to remand.240 In addition, if Congress
does establish a “lack of good faith intent to prosecute” standard, plaintiffs
seeking to avoid removal will simply respond by taking sufficient action to
avoid removal, such as seeking discovery from the spoiler. Thus, a “lack of
good faith intent to prosecute” standard is likely to be unavailing.
The “lack of good faith intent to prosecute” standard is a corollary to
the “bad faith in order to prevent a defendant from removing” standard
established by the Federal Court Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act
of 2011 (JVCA).241 The JVCA established an exception to the bar on removal of cases based upon diversity jurisdiction more than one year after
commencement in state court if “the district court finds that the plaintiff
has acted in bad faith in order to prevent a defendant from removing the
action.”242 In enacting the “bad faith to prevent removal” exception, Congress purposefully codified the equitable exception to the one-year bar
that was recognized by the Fifth Circuit in Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co.243
An analysis of district courts’ application of the Tedford equitable exception found that more than 83% of cases removed based upon the exception were remanded back to state court after the district court found no
discovery disputes, especially where the inquiry would seek to invade the thoughtprocesses of the plaintiff’s counsel”); Hearing on H.R. 3624, supra note 1, at 73
(statement of Arthur D. Hellman).
237. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-422, at 15.
238. See, e.g., Joe v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 257 F. Supp. 2d 845, 850 & n.9 (S.D.
Miss. 2003).
239. See, e.g., In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 7md-1871, 2014 WL 2011597, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 2014) (finding plaintiffs had
no intent to prosecute claim against forum defendant because they had not sought
discovery from such defendant).
240. For a discussion of such time periods, see supra notes 24–30 and accompanying text.
241. See Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub.
L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
242. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1) (2012).
243. 327 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2003).
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basis for removal jurisdiction.244 Given that district courts are considering
the “bad faith to prevent removal” standard more than one year after the
litigation has been commenced, there is likely to be much more objective
evidence regarding plaintiffs’ intent at that point than would exist when
district courts would be examining the “lack of good faith intent to prosecute” standard. Even with the greater availability of evidence after the
one-year period, however, removing defendants were able to establish
plaintiffs’ bad faith only in fewer than seventeen percent of the cases removed.245 Thus, there is good reason to predict that the “good faith intent to prosecute” standard will result in a similarly high remand rate
given the likely lack of available objective evidence.
In addition, the open-ended nature of the “lack of good faith intent
to prosecute” standard will invite and encourage defendants to remove
based upon a very wide range of acts or omissions by the plaintiff, even if
such acts or omissions have slight probative value as to the plaintiff’s intent
to prosecute. As argued above, defendants risk relatively little but stand to
benefit a great deal from removal, even if the case is remanded to state
court.246 Thus, the “lack of good faith intent to prosecute” provision will
generate more removal/remand litigation without securing any corresponding benefit of preventing fraudulent joinder given the minimal
amount of evidence that is likely to exist when the large majority of motions to remand are ruled upon and the relative ease with which plaintiffs
can create objective evidence of a “good faith intent to prosecute.”
Another issue that might be problematic, or is at least unorthodox, is
that the bill appears to foreclose consideration of direct evidence regarding the plaintiff’s subjective intent.247 While it is understandable that
Congress might not want to intrude into the plaintiff’s and the plaintiff’s
lawyer’s subjective intent, it is reasonable to predict that, in at least a narrow range of cases, the plaintiff might desire to submit evidence of the
plaintiff’s subjective intent or motive—i.e., an explanation of the plaintiff’s motive for joining the spoiler or a subjective explanation of the manner in which the claim against the spoiler is being prosecuted. The bill
would prohibit a court from considering the plaintiff’s own explanation
even though such explanation might be highly probative of the plaintiff’s
subjective intent.
To the extent that legislative or judicial reform occurs, an objective
test focused on the basis for the plaintiff’s claim against the spoiler will
adequately and efficiently prevent fraudulent joinder. The bill’s “lack of
244. See Percy, supra note 140, at 179.
245. See id. at 180.
246. See supra notes 140–46 and accompanying text.
247. In other areas of the law where a party’s subjective intent is at issue,
relevant evidence includes not only objective evidence from which the party’s subjective intent can be inferred, but also direct evidence of the party’s subjective
intent.
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good faith intent to prosecute” provision would further complicate an already complex issue without achieving meaningful results.248
VIII.

THE “ACTUAL FRAUD”

IN THE

PLEADINGS STANDARD

As a final basis for fraudulent joinder, the bill includes a finding of
“actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts with respect to that
defendant.”249 House Report 422 indicates that “misrepresenting or concealing the citizenship of a party” constitutes “actual fraud.”250 For example, a plaintiff might purposefully misrepresent that one of the defendants
is a citizen of the same state as the plaintiff in an effort to defeat removal.
As is demonstrated below, the “actual fraud in the pleadings” standard
raises many questions and is essentially a solution in search of a problem.
A.

“Actual Fraud”

With respect to fraudulent joinder based upon “actual fraud in the
pleading of jurisdictional facts,” the bill does not define what constitutes
“actual fraud.” Nor does it indicate whether the actual fraud must have
been for the purpose of preventing removal. Although several circuit
courts have held that a plaintiff’s “outright fraud” or “actual fraud” in the
pleading of jurisdictional facts constitutes fraudulent joinder,251 none
have clearly articulated what constitutes actual or outright fraud.252 Even
though actual fraud in the pleadings of jurisdictional facts has long been
248. The two law professors who provided testimony at the hearing on the bill
share this view. See Hearing on H.R. 3624, supra note 1, at 72–75 (statement of
Arthur D. Hellman) (stating “good faith intention” prong would be difficult to
administer given that little evidence would exist during requisite time period); id.
at 27–28 (statement of Lonny Hoffman) (stating bill gives no guidance as to how
district courts should determine good faith and also that there is likely to be little
objective evidence at time motions to remand are adjudicated).
249. See Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016, H.R. 3624, 114th Cong.
§ 2.
250. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-422, at 12 (2016).
251. See, e.g., Dutcher v. Matheson, 733 F.3d 980, 988 (10th Cir. 2013) (“actual fraud”); Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2009)
(“actual fraud”); Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752, 763 n.9 (7th
Cir. 2009) (“actual fraud”); Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th
Cir. 2004) (“actual fraud”); Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 464 (4th Cir. 1999)
(“outright fraud”); Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 461 (2d Cir.
1998) (“outright fraud”); Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir.
1990) (“outright fraud”); Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433, 1440 (11th Cir.
1983) (“outright fraud”), superseded by statute as stated by Stillwell v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
663 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 2011).
252. See Sticker Synergy Corp. v. Gwyn, Civil Action No. 14-2521, 2015 WL
4097215, at *8 n.104 (E.D. La. July 6, 2015) (noting Fifth Circuit has not expressly
defined “actual fraud” in pleadings); Randle v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 338 F.
Supp. 2d 704, 707 n.4 (S.D. Miss. 2014) (“[T]here is a dearth of case law discussing
[actual fraud in the pleadings], and hence, little guidance on what must be present before a finding of actual fraud in pleading jurisdictional facts in a motion to
remand.”); Rodriguez v. Casa Chapa S.A., de C.V., 394 F. Supp. 2d 901, 906 (W.D.
Tex. 2005) (discussing same).
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recognized as a type of fraudulent joinder, district courts have rarely
found such actual fraud.253
Not surprisingly, the few district courts that have considered the
meaning of “actual fraud” in the pleadings have found that this type of
fraudulent joinder requires something “more than a mistake or omission
in the pleadings,”254 such as a “deliberate ‘false representation.’”255 As
noted by two district courts addressing allegations of actual fraud in the
pleadings, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “actual fraud” as “[a] concealment or false representation through a statement or conduct that injures
another who relies on it in acting.”256 As further noted by one district
court, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “fraud” as “[a] knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act
to his or her detriment.”257 These definitions, however, cannot be easily
transposed to the term “actual fraud” in the bill. Both definitions include
not only affirmative misrepresentations but also concealment.258 Given
that the bill refers to actual fraud in the pleadings, it might reasonably be
interpreted to be limited to affirmative misrepresentation of jurisdictional
facts in the pleadings because pleadings are by their nature affirmative
representations of fact and do not involve the type of conduct that would
typically be considered concealment. Moreover, given that procedural
rules in many states generally do not require plaintiffs to plead facts in the
complaint that are relevant to federal court subject matter jurisdiction,
such as the parties’ states of citizenship, the omission of such facts should
253. See Sticker, 2015 WL 4097215, at *8 (“The issue of actual fraud in the
pleadings does not appear to be widely litigated . . . .”); Randle, F. Supp. 2d at 707
n.4 (indicating that court was not aware of any case involving fraudulent joinder
based upon actual fraud in pleadings); Coffman v. Dole Fresh Fruit Co., 927 F.
Supp. 2d 427, 434 (E.D. Tex. 2013) (“Few courts have addressed fraudulent joinder based on actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts.”); Rodriguez, 394 F.
Supp. 2d at 906 (noting large majority of fraudulent joinder cases do not involve
actual fraud in pleadings); Cordill v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 1:02CV00121, 2002
WL 31474466, at *2 n.5 (W.D. Va. Nov. 5, 2002) (“While not unheard of, outright
fraud in the pleadings is uncommon . . . .”).
254. See Coffman v. Dole Fresh Fruit Co., 927 F. Supp. 2d 427, 435 (E.D. Tex.
2013).
255. See Augustine v. Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co., No. 2:08-cv-1102, 2010 WL
4930317, at *8 (W.D. La. Nov. 30, 2010); see also Randle, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 707 n.4
(recognizing some intentional misrepresentation is necessary).
256. See Augustine, 2010 WL 4930317, at *7 (quoting Actual Fraud, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)); Rodriguez, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 906 (quoting Actual
Fraud, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004))).
257. See Rodriguez, 394 F. Supp. 2d 901 at 906 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (quoting
Fraud, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)).
258. The Restatement (Second) of Torts distinguishes between fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment. Section 525 governs liability for fraudulent misrepresentation and Section 550 governs liability for fraudulent
concealment. Pursuant to Section 550, fraudulent concealment occurs when one
person, “by concealment or other action intentionally prevents [another] from
acquiring material information.” See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: LIABILITY
FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 550 (2016).
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not constitute fraud absent a duty to include such facts.259 House Report
422, however, suggests that concealing the citizenship of a party may constitute “actual fraud” in the pleadings.260
Another question that might arise based upon the differing definitions of “fraud” and “actual fraud” is whether “actual fraud” requires that
the misrepresentation to have been made for the purpose of preventing
the diverse defendant from removing the case to federal court. In Augustine v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co.,261 the district court found that the
plaintiffs deliberately misrepresented that the sole member of a defendant
LLC was a “Louisiana sole proprietor” so that the diverse defendant
“would rely upon that statement to conclude it was unable to remove [the
case] because true diversity did not exist.”262 Although the court found
that the plaintiffs purposefully misrepresented the LLC member’s citizenship for the purpose of preventing removal, it is not clear from the bill
whether the district court must find that a plaintiff purposefully misrepresented jurisdictional facts or that the plaintiff purposefully misrepresented
jurisdictional facts for the purpose of preventing removal. A different statutory provision governing removal in another context explicitly requires
the district court to make a finding that a plaintiff acted in bad faith for
the purpose of preventing removal.263 The lack of such explicit language
in this bill might be intentional or the result of oversight. The resolution
of this issue is not likely to have a large impact given the rarity of actual
fraud in the pleadings and the likelihood that a removal-prevention purpose may be reasonably inferred in the absence of any other explanation
for an intentional misrepresentation of jurisdictional facts. In Augustine,
the plaintiffs were essentially forced to concede that they knew the LLC
member was not a Louisiana citizen at the time the complaint was filed
because the plaintiffs had requested that service upon the LLC member
be made pursuant to Louisiana’s long-arm statute governing personal jurisdiction over nonresidents.264 The Augustine court may well have in259. Many state courts are courts of general jurisdiction in which the plaintiff
is not required to plead facts regarding the defendant’s state of citizenship or a
specific amount in controversy. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 47(b); see also Alice M.
Noble-Allgire, Removal of Diversity Actions When the Amount in Controversy Cannot Be
Determined from the Face of the Plaintiff’s Complaint: The Need for Judicial and Statutory
Reform to Preserve Defendant’s Equal Access to Federal Courts, 62 MO. L. REV. 681,
686–90 (1997).
260. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-422, at 11 (2016).
261. No. 2:08-cv-1102, 2010 WL 4930317 (W.D. La. Nov. 30, 2010).
262. See id. at *7. Given that the citizenship of an LLC is determined by the
citizenship of its members, plaintiff’s allegation regarding the LLC member’s citizenship was a pleading of jurisdictional facts. See id. at *8.
263. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (c)(1) provides that “[a] case may not be removed
under subsection (b)(3) on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332
more than 1 year after commencement of the action, unless the district court finds
that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith in order to prevent a defendant from removing the action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1) (2012).
264. See Augustine, 2010 WL 4930317, at *7.
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ferred plaintiffs’ motive due to the lack of any other explanation for the
misrepresentation.
B.

“Jurisdictional Facts”

Not only does the bill fail to define “actual fraud,” it also fails to define “jurisdictional facts.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “jurisdictional
fact” as “a fact that must exist for a court to properly exercise its jurisdiction over a case, party, or thing.”265 Many courts have referred to allegations regarding a party’s citizenship as allegations of jurisdictional facts.266
Although a plaintiff’s allegation concerning the amount in controversy
with respect to a claim against a diverse defendant is an allegation of jurisdictional fact in a case based upon diversity jurisdiction, an intentional
misrepresentation of the amount in controversy with respect to the claim
against a diverse defendant does not constitute fraudulent joinder of a
non-diverse or in-state defendant. It is another type of strategic forum
manipulation in which plaintiffs may engage, but that type of manipulation has already been addressed by the JVCA’s amendment to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(c)(3), which authorizes removal of a case based upon diversity
more than one year after commencement in state court if the district court
finds that the plaintiff acted in bad faith by deliberately failing to disclose
the amount in controversy to prevent removal.
A few courts have refused to limit “jurisdictional facts” to those relevant to a party’s citizenship. In Rodriguez v. Casa Chapa S.A. de C.V.,267 the
court rejected a restrictive interpretation of “jurisdictional facts” as those
limited to a party’s citizenship or the amount in controversy and held that
“jurisdictional facts can encompass other facts proximately leading to jurisdictional concerns.”268 There, the court found that the plaintiffs had
committed actual fraud in the pleadings by suing a non-diverse defendant
against whom they had no intention to seek a judgment.269 A few courts
considering “actual fraud in the pleadings” have considered or indicated a
willingness to consider the evidentiary basis for the plaintiff’s allegations
of fact relevant to the merits of the substantive state law claim against the
jurisdictional spoiler.270 If legislation establishes an “actual fraud in the
pleadings” standard, it should clarify what facts are jurisdictional.
265. See Rodriguez v. Casa Chapa S.A. de C.V, 394 F. Supp. 2d 901, 907 (W.D.
Tex. 2005) (quoting Jurisdictional Fact, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)).
266. See, e.g., Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256, 259 (5th
Cir. 1995); Sticker Synergy Corp. v. Gwyn, No. 14-2521, 2015 WL 4097215, at *8
n.104 (E.D. La. July 6, 2015); Marabella v. Autonation U.S.A. Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d
750, 752 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
267. 394 F. Supp. 2d 901 (W.D. Tex. 2005).
268. See id. at 907.
269. See id. at 907–08.
270. See, e.g., Worldwide Battery Co., LLC v. Johnson Controls, Inc., No. 1:06cv-00602-DFH-TAB, 2006 WL 3201915, at *3 (S.D. Ind. July 7, 2006) (finding sufficient evidence of plaintiff’s allegations that defendants made defamatory state-

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss1/6

42

Percy: The Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016: Moving the Law in

2017]

FRAUDULENT JOINDER PREVENTION
C.

255

Applicable Evidentiary Burden

The bill also fails to indicate the applicable evidentiary burden. Presumably, the burden is on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff engaged in actual fraud in pleading jurisdictional facts.271 A few district
courts have held that the defendant must prove actual fraud in pleading
by clear and convincing evidence.272 Most courts require plaintiffs bringing tort claims for fraud to prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence.273 The traditional justification for the greater burden in that
context is that liability for fraud may damage the defendant’s reputation
and will likely subject the defendant to a claim for punitive damages.274 A
more recent explanation for the greater burden suggests that it is “better
understood as a protection against encroachment into the law of contract
by the law of tort.”275 Because most fraud claims arise from transactions
between two parties, the law prefers that disputes arising from such transactions be resolved by contract law rather that tort law.276 Neither of these
justifications is applicable in the removal context. A greater burden for
proving actual fraud in the pleadings might be justified as consistent with
a defendant’s heavy burden to prove removal jurisdiction.277
D.

A Solution in Search of a Problem

Given the number of issues raised by the bill’s “actual fraud in the
pleadings” standard and the rarity with which actual fraud in the pleadings
has been found to be the basis for removal based upon fraudulent joinder,
this provision of the bill may be appropriately characterized as a solution
in search of a problem. The provision does not target joinder that is
fraudulent. Instead, it focuses on the accuracy of the allegations regarding jurisdictional facts.278 Any questions regarding a party’s true citizenship, however, can be resolved without relying on the fraudulent joinder
ments about plaintiff to demonstrate that such allegations were not frivolous or
fraudulent).
271. See Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921) (holding
that removing defendants bear burden of proving diversity jurisdiction based upon
alleged fraudulent joinder).
272. See, e.g., B.N. ex rel. Novick v. Bnei Levi, Inc., No. 12-CV-5057, 2013 WL
168698, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2013); Tucker v. Kaleida Health, No. 09-CV-719S,
2011 WL 1260117, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2011); Campisi v. Swissport Cargo
Servs., LP., No. 09-CV-1507(FB)(JMA), 2010 WL 375878, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26,
2010).
273. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 9
cmt. e (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2 2014).
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See supra notes 148–51 and accompanying text.
278. A plaintiff who commits fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts has
not acted inappropriately in joining the claims against the jurisdictional spoiler—
only in pleading facts relevant to a properly joined party’s citizenship.
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doctrine. If the plaintiff innocently, negligently, or intentionally misrepresents jurisdictional facts regarding a party’s citizenship, the defendants
may simply remove and assert that complete diversity does in fact exist. If
the plaintiff moves to remand, the defendants then bear the burden of
proving that complete diversity exists. The defendants are not required to
prove that the plaintiff intentionally misrepresented a party’s citizenship.
Thus, not only does the bill’s “actual fraud in the pleadings” provision
raise several questions regarding the scope of its application, but it is also
totally unnecessary in order to protect diverse defendants’ right to remove
in cases where the plaintiff has made false allegations about a party’s citizenship in an effort to defeat removal jurisdiction. To the extent legislation is enacted to reform the fraudulent joinder doctrine, it should omit
“actual fraud in the pleadings” as a basis for finding fraudulent joinder.
IX. CONCLUSION
The common law fraudulent joinder doctrine is “inherently complex”
and nuanced.279 The doctrine, however, will continue to be relevant and
necessary as long as Congress continues to grant federal court jurisdiction
that requires complete diversity. In 1990, the congressionally appointed
Federal Courts Study Committee recommended that Congress do away
with diversity jurisdiction with a few exceptions: complex multi-state litigation, interpleader, and suits involving aliens.280 The report concluded
that “no other class of cases has a weaker claim on federal judicial resources” or is as responsible for growth of the federal caseload.281 The
report acknowledged the possibility of local bias in some district courts but
found that such possibility was not compelling enough to justify continued
diversity jurisdiction.282 Others have similarly questioned the continued
need for diversity jurisdiction.283 Although Congress was unwilling to
limit diversity jurisdiction in the suggested manner, it did increase the
279. See Richardson, supra note 178, at 122.
280. See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE 38 (1990).
281. See id. at 32.
282. See id. at 40. The report also concluded that there was little need for a
federal forum in most diversity cases, noting that federal courts enjoy no advantage
in interpreting state law given that “[f]ederal rulings on state law issues have little
precedential effect.” See id. at 33.
283. See, e.g., Nima Mohebbi, Craig Reiser & Samuel Greenberg, A Dynamic
Formula for the Amount in Controversy, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 95, 100–01 (2013) (citing
numerous scholars who view general diversity jurisdiction as unjustified); Percy,
supra note 3, at 200–01 (reviewing arguments made by academics and others in
favor of abolishing diversity jurisdiction); James M. Underwood, The Late, Great
Diversity Jurisdiction, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 196–98 (2006) (noting that numerous judges, academics, and special interest groups propose abolishing diversity
jurisdiction).
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amount-in-controversy requirement from $50,000 to $75,000 in 1996,
thereby decreasing diversity jurisdiction.284
Since the 1990 report, however, Congress has enacted several statutes
that have expanded diversity jurisdiction and jurisdiction over state law
claims,285 including (i) the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, establishing supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that are part of the
same case or controversy as claims over which federal courts have original
jurisdiction,286 (ii) the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of
2002, extending federal jurisdiction to mass tort cases involving minimal
diversity if they arise out of a single accident that caused the death of seventy-five people or more,287 (iii) the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,
extending federal jurisdiction to class actions involving minimal diversity if
the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million,288 and (iv) the Jurisdiction
and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, extending removal jurisdiction based
upon diversity by recognizing a “bad faith” exception to the bar on removal of diversity cases more than one year after commencement in state
court.289 The advantages and disadvantages of limiting versus extending
diversity jurisdiction are beyond the scope of this Article.290 It may well be
284. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110
Stat. 3847 (codified in several sections of judicial code).
285. See., e.g., Underwood, supra note 283, at 202 (observing that in enacting
discussed legislation extending diversity jurisdiction, “Congress . . . chose[ ] a path
that will lead to a resurgence in the importance of diversity jurisdiction, and which
may be a harbinger for additional aggressive exercises of [diversity jurisdiction] . . .
in the future”).
286. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 310(a),
104 Stat. 5089, 5113 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012)). Although
courts had exercised “pendant claim jurisdiction” prior to the passage of the Act,
the Supreme Court interpreted the Act to no longer require each plaintiff to establish the minimum amount in controversy, thereby expanding jurisdiction over
claims based upon state law. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545
U.S. 546, 558–59 (2005).
287. See Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-273, § 11020, 116 Stat. 1758, 1825–28 (codified in Chapter 85 of 28 U.S.C.).
288. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
289. See Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub.
L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.); see also supra notes 241–43 and accompanying text.
290. It has been suggested that Congress enacted some of these recent statutes extending diversity jurisdiction without considering the traditional justifications for diversity jurisdiction and in the absence of any overall coherent view of
the modern day justification for diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Underwood, supra
note 283, at 208–09 (noting that Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act “bestow[s] diversity jurisdiction for reasons unrelated to the prevention of local bias”
and concluding that “dramatic step by Congress . . . has ‘broad implications’ for
issues of federalism” (citing C. Douglas Floyd, The Limits of Minimal Diversity, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 613, 627 (2004))). It has also been suggested that Congress enacted
this recent legislation expending diversity jurisdiction in response to the business
lobby that has spent millions of dollars to funnel class actions and other complex
litigation into federal courts. See, e.g., David Rogers & Monica Langley, Bush Set to
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time for Congress to completely reconsider the continued need for diversity jurisdiction and the extent to which continued diversity jurisdiction
should require complete diversity. In the meantime, however, any legislation that expands removal jurisdiction based upon diversity should be the
product of considered study and examination.
While the bill’s impact might be viewed as modest when compared to
some recent legislation extending diversity jurisdiction, and in light of the
fact that Congress could totally do away with the complete diversity requirement, such perspective fails to consider whether the bill appropriately balances numerous factors, including (i) federalism concerns that
are raised every time Congress broadens original diversity jurisdiction or
removal jurisdiction based upon diversity, (ii) diverse defendants’ interest
in having state law claims decided in federal court, (iii) whether there is
any helpful existing precedent that will guide courts in the application of
new fraudulent joinder standards, (iv) the likely success of any new fraudulent joinder standards in achieving uniformity, (v) the additional costs that
will be generated by the increased fraudulent joinder litigation that the
bill is certain to produce, and (vi) whether the new fraudulent joinder
standards will give rise to greater abuse by removing defendants.
The Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act does not move the law in the
right direction. The bill’s plausibility standard for fraudulent joinder will
generate substantial litigation and fail to produce a uniform standard,
while also raising federalism concerns. The bill’s provision authorizing
unlimited piercing of the pleadings invites runaway fraudulent joinder
proceedings that mirror summary judgment proceedings. The bill’s abrogation of the common defense rule not only raises federalism concerns
but also implies distrust of state courts. The bill’s “good faith intent to
prosecute” standard is unlikely to be effective due to the unavailability of
objective evidence at the relevant time and the relative ease with which
plaintiffs may objectively demonstrate a “good faith intent to prosecute.”
The bill’s “actual fraud in the pleadings” standard is problematic and
unnecessary.
Rather than pass a bill that appears to have been introduced at the
behest of various special interest groups without careful vetting by judges,
lawyers, academics, and others, Congress should undertake a thorough examination of the fraudulent joinder doctrine. In doing so, it should consider the appropriate standard for determining fraudulent joinder, the
degree to which district courts may pierce the pleadings, whether common defenses and common defects can be considered when determining
fraudulent joinder, whether the voluntary/involuntary rule should be ab-

Sign Landmark Bill on Class Actions, WALL ST. J., (Feb. 18, 2005, 12:01 AM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB110866599480657890 [https://perma.cc/4E55-2EQY].
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rogated,291 and whether any such reform should also delineate the contours of the emerging fraudulent misjoinder doctrine.292
291. See supra notes 27 and 154 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 61.
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